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31.  Introduction 
Ethnic proﬁling is deﬁned as the law enforcement practice of using racial, ethnic or reli-
gious stereotypes when making decisions on whom to stop, search, verify identiﬁcation 
documents, arrest or detain, mine databases, gather intelligence and other techniques. 
Ethnic proﬁling assumes that these characteristics will help predict which people will 
be involved in particular crimes.
This approach is a form of discrimination and unlawful according to international 
and European law. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance recom-
mends for every member state to “clearly deﬁne and prohibit racial proﬁling by law”, 
while within the meaning of its recommendation ethnic proﬁling means “the use by the 
police, with no objective and reasonable justiﬁcation, of grounds such as race, colour, 
language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin in control, surveillance or 
investigation activities”.1
Evidence shows that ethnic proﬁling is not only ineﬀective, but it may also be counter-
productive. Proﬁling perpetuates negative stereotypes and stigmatizes entire groups of 
people as “suspect communities”. Furthermore, it misdirects law enforcement resources, 
alienating some of the very people whose cooperation is necessary for eﬀective crime 
detection and prevention.
Research carried out by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) in 2002–2003 
concerning discrimination against Roma in the Hungarian criminal justice system ex-
posed direct racial proﬁling by police. By scrutinizing court ﬁles, the research examined 
1 See: ECRI General Policy Recommendation N° 11 on combating racism and racial discrimination in 
policing at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/3-general_themes/1-policy_recommen-
dations/recommendation_n11/1-Recommendation_11.asp#TopOfPage.
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– among other things – how perpetrators were initially detected by authorities. The 
ﬁndings of the survey appeared to be fully in line with similar Anglo-American studies 
which analyzed procedural discrimination against visible minorities in criminal justice 
systems.
The researchers found that Roma oﬀenders and suspects were signiﬁcantly more likely 
to have been identiﬁed via police stops. In the case of non-minority suspects, however, 
most of them were caught in the act. The researchers attributed the diﬀerences to bias in 
the system: non-Roma, if not caught in the act, had much better chances of completely 
avoiding liability, whereas Roma had a much higher chance of being identiﬁed as having 
committed a crime through ID checks. One good source for the diﬀerence, explained 
the researchers, might be the police stop practices. On average, one-ﬁfth of researched 
court cases involved individuals identiﬁed by police stops. 
To ﬁnd out whether discriminatory ID check methods are relevant to the diﬀerential 
treatment of the Roma, it was necessary to analyze that aspect of police practice. In 
2005, the Hungarian Social Research Institute (TÁRKI) carried out qualitative research 
which found that the Roma are indeed discriminated against in the context of ID 
checks by the police. Discrimination was especially conspicuous in the practice of stop-
ping pedestrians, with Roma pedestrians disproportionately stopped. Once stopped, 
they are more likely to experience disrespectful treatment. The research concluded that, 
based on the respondents’ reports, ethnic proﬁling exists in Hungary,2 and established 
that ostensibly rational considerations are often raised to justify the discriminatory 
practice, namely the assumption that correlation exists between ethnic identity and 
potential criminal behavior. The research also highlighted strong prejudices regarding 
minorities and presumed patterns of oﬀending in both the police and the general popu-
lation. Contributory issues included poor supervisory structures within the police, and 
little or no measurement concerning the productivity of stops. 
The analysis of ID check practices, therefore, turned out to be of utmost importance. 
If it were proven that, during police ID checks, Roma in general (and not only those 
who constituted a part of the research sample in 2002–2003) are under closer scrutiny 
than their non-Roma peers, the focus of public discourse might change. Questions 
2 See: Pap, A. L., Miller, J., Gounev, P., Wagman, D., Balogi, A., Bezlov, T., Simonovits, B. and Vargha, 
L.: Racism and Police Stops – Adapting US and British Debates to Continental Europe, In: European 
Journal of Criminology, 2008/5, pp. 161–191.; and Pap, A. L.: Police Ethnic Proﬁling in Hungary 
– Lessons from an International Research, In: Regio, A review of Studies on Minorities, Politics, Society, 
2007, Vol. 10., pp. 117–140.
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would arise surrounding the eﬀectiveness of policing based on prejudicial practices, as 
well as the side-eﬀects of carrying out such proﬁling on the police themselves. It should 
also be analyzed whether these side-eﬀects are worth the price of possibly ﬁnding more 
criminals.
The international Strategies for Eﬀective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS) project 
(described in detail below) sought to change police stop and search policy and practice. 
In Hungary, a research/action approach was used in the development of new practices 
in pilot sites. For the purposes of the research, an emphasis was put on wide-range 
data collection on the ethnic aspects and general eﬃciency of ID checks (ID check 
data broken down by ethnicity has never been collected in Hungary). As for the action 
element, police oﬃcers were trained on the deﬁnition and relevant aspects of ethnic 
proﬁling, with special instruction focused on its disadvantages (the notion is practically 
non-existent in the education of police oﬃcers or in the wider public). The project also 
aimed to develop links between local Roma communities and the police. 
The political riots in Budapest in 2006-2007, with a heavy-handed police response, 
created a climate of mistrust towards the police. The public began questioning of the 
use of police powers, including ID checks. This in turn created demands for reform, so 
the project results may signiﬁcantly contribute to restoring society’s trust in the police.
The STEPSS project in Hungary was also relevant from the aspect of anti-discrimi-
nation, which is a relatively new ﬁeld in the Hungarian legal system. Although the 
Constitution3 contains anti-discrimination provisions, and Article 70/A provides a 
general ban on discrimination, the country had not had a separate and coherent law 
on the concepts, deﬁnitions and sui generis sanctions related to this ﬁeld. It was only 
in 2003 when Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal 
Opportunities (ETA) was adopted by the Parliament, transposing the two most impor-
tant EU directives in this area.4 
Our standpoint is that institutional practice based on ethnic proﬁling constitutes direct 
discrimination within the meaning of the ETA, and is therefore not simply ineﬀective 
(as it will be explained in more detail below), but also unlawful. 
3 Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary.
4 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupa-
tion.
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In the following pages we provide a brief description of the project methodology and 
rules, introduce the legal and institutional framework of ID checks in Hungary, and 
share the project results. Finally, we propose recommendations based on the results, the 
implementation of which could mean signiﬁcant improvements in the ﬁeld of ethnic 
proﬁling and policing.
72.  The STEPSS Project in Hungary
2.1 Institutional framework – The role of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
and its partners
Within the framework of the STEPSS project (carried out with the ﬁnancial support 
of the European Commission’s AGIS Program and the Open Society Institute), ethnic 
proﬁling was scrutinized in three countries: Spain, Bulgaria and Hungary. The aim 
of the project was to elaborate a new model of stop and search practices by training 
police oﬃcers, examining the existing legal framework, involving members of minority 
communities in the project activities, creating more eﬀective ways of supervising oﬃ-
cers’ work, and to test the model in practice. 
The implementation of the STEPSS project in Hungary was reliant on close coopera-
tion between three project partners: the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC), the 
National Police Headquarters (NPH), and the Hungarian Police College (HPC).
In January 2007, the HHC concluded an agreement with the NPH and the HPC, 
deﬁning the responsibilities of each of the three partners vis-à-vis the project. The funda-
mental rule was that the project documents were to be produced by the HHC and 
commented on by the NPH. The HHC was responsible for the coordination of the 
partners’ activities, including that of the Roma civilian monitors (see below), while the 
NPH was responsible for the training component. Besides coordination, the HHC 
staﬀ was actively involved in a formal review of the legislative framework, the develop-
ment and implementation of the training, the creation of a formal monitoring program, 
and the organization of its civilian component. The HHC wrote and distributed the 
Hungarian country report, as well as disseminated the ﬁnal comparative report. The 
primary responsibility of the NPH was the coordination of the participating police units’ 
work, however, the police took part in the elaboration of all project documents as well.
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Ethnic proﬁling and discrimination are highly sensitive issues in Hungary, so the part-
ners, in acknowledgment of this complexity, thought it best to address the public jointly. 
The partners agreed that the project results would be shared with the wider commu-
nity at a joint press conference, which was held on 21 February 2007. Any further 
results were also to be announced together with all of the partners. Interpretation of 
the same facts may vary widely, depending on an individual’s or group’s circumstances. 
For instance, certain data concerning policing might seem irrational, but at the same 
time might be justiﬁed in light of special professional considerations. It might also 
happen that a disagreement, e.g. concerning disproportional ID check patterns, cannot 
be resolved because of ﬁxed, yet divergent perspectives. In such a case, the fair solution 
is to inform the public about all views. 
The HHC selected representatives from the Roma community in each pilot site who 
performed the internal monitoring of the project. These individuals also functioned as 
a link between the local police and the Roma community. The community representa-
tives submitted a brief report via mail shortly after each time they patrolled alongside 
the police. It was in these reports where they could indicate whether or not they faced 
any problem during the patrols. 
The NPH and the HPC appointed persons within their organization responsible for 
performing tasks related to the project. This was done with an eye toward developing 
eﬃcient lines of communication. This way, the HHC’s coordinator needed only to 
contact one person at the NPH. Any request from the HHC would be received by 
the local police forces from their superior, who before forwarding the request could 
also check whether it was in line with the formal rules regulating the operation of the 
police. Although all oﬃcial requests had to go through these formal channels, this rule 
did not prevent or exclude the possibility of direct contact between the HHC and the 
local police.  
2.2 Legal framework, the special characteristics of ID checks in Hungary
Under Hungarian legal provisions, an ID check is an action through which an autho-
rized person establishes the ID checked person’s identity. This covers an extremely wide 
range of activities, as not only those measures are included which are carried out for the 
explicit purpose of establishing a person’s identity, but almost every single act where an 
oﬃcer comes into direct contact with a citizen. The proportion of such non-autono-
mous ID checks ranges between 10–30% according to the estimation of police oﬃ-
cers participating in the project. Such non-autonomous ID checks are carried out for 
instance in the course of searching for witnesses (i.e. when in the neighborhood of a 
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crime everyone is asked by the police whether they saw anything relevant related to the 
given oﬀence). In such cases ID checks are complementary to other police measures. 
The vast majority of ID checks, however, are autonomous measures in the sense that 
they are carried out for the sole purpose of identifying an individual. Act XXXIV of 
1994 on the Police (hereafter Police Act) does not diﬀerentiate between autonomous 
and non-autonomous ID checks, and therefore the two types of measures could not be 
handled separately in the research, but the fact that the number of ID checks contains 
instances in which the check is part of the normal course of action and is not performed 
upon the acting oﬃcer’s discretion, needs to be taken into account when analyzing the 
Hungarian practice.
2.2.1 The statutory deﬁnition of ID check and its legally permitted aims
According to the Hungarian legal provisions, the term “ID check” means similar police 
measures instituted for diﬀerent purposes. Technically the concept refers to the measure 
deﬁned under Article 29 of the Police Act, however, based on an in-depth analysis we 
can diﬀerentiate between four types of ID checks:5
a) “Classical” ID checks
b) ID checks performed in the course of traﬃc control
c) Non-autonomous ID checks
d) ID checks carried out in the course of intensive control
a) As per Article 29 of the Police Act, a police oﬃcer may check the identity of any 
person whose personal identity needs to be established. The provision in force since 
1 January 2008 lists the legally permitted aims of the measure: protection of public 
order, public safety, crime prevention and crime detection, establishing the lawful 
stay of the concerned person, protection of the rights of the person checked and of 
other natural or legal persons. 
b) ID checks can also be carried out in the course of traﬃc control when the existence 
of the aims listed above is not a precondition for lawfully applying an ID check. 
Based on the wording of Article 44 of the Police Act, traﬃc control can be performed 
in order to establish whether the car driver has a driving license or whether he/she 
lawfully possesses the car, so the acting oﬃcer is not required to justify the necessity 
of the concrete measure beyond this, as he/she may lawfully carry out an ID check 
even if the suspicion of the driver’s unlawful behavior is completely missing. 
5 Other categories are also possible, our solution is useful for understanding the whole structure of the 
STEPSS research.
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c) In case of non-autonomous ID checks the aim of the primary measure shall stand 
for the lawfully permitted aim of the given check, therefore if the primary measure 
is lawful, the lawfulness of the ID check cannot be questioned either. If for instance 
the police oﬃcer hears someone as a witness at the scene of an accident, the checking 
of the witness’s identity will be an inevitable part of the hearing, so the lawfulness of 
the ID check may not be questioned separately from that of the hearing.
d) In accordance with Article 30 of the Police Act, the head of a police unit may order 
intensive control in order to arrest a criminal suspect, or prevent or frustrate an 
action or incident posing a threat to public safety. In such cases, within the terri-
tory deﬁned in the decision ordering intensive control, everyone may be lawfully 
ID checked even if the speciﬁc reasons outlined in Article 29 do not prevail. (Thus, 
in such cases, the oﬃcer conducting the check is not required to assess individual 
circumstances, and within the area and time deﬁned in the order he/she will be 
authorized to check every single person without further justiﬁcation.)
2.2.2 The required level of suspicion
The minimal level of suspicion required to justify an ID check is not determined by law. 
According to Hungarian law, the existence of a so-called “simple suspicion”, a theoretical 
concept not deﬁned in detail (and meaning a lesser degree of certainty than the “well-
grounded suspicion” required for the initiation of a criminal proceeding) is enough for 
any police measure to be applied. In practice the concept means that a person may be 
subjected to an ID check if a police oﬃcer believes on the basis of any information or 
data at his/her disposal that, under the circumstances, a police action is necessary. As 
the Police Act requires oﬃcers to take or initiate measures upon ﬁnding (or being noti-
ﬁed of ) a fact or circumstance which demands police intervention, a police oﬃcer is 
under an obligation to act in the event the simple suspicion is in place.6
2.2.3 Proportionality as general requirement
The Police Act sets the requirement of proportionality: a police measure shall not cause 
a detriment which is manifestly disproportionate to the lawful objective of the measure. 
When given several possible options for police action or means of coercion, the one 
which is both eﬀective and causes the least restriction, injury or damage to the aﬀected 
person shall be chosen. On the principle that an ID check possibly poses the least 
restriction possible on a person subject to police action, such checks are deemed justiﬁed 
if any data or information exists that a police action is necessary in the given situation.
6 Article 13 (1) of the Police Act.
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2.3 Project activities
The STEPSS project was carried out in three pilot sites across Hungary: Budapest’s 
6th District, Szeged and Kaposvár. These three locations represent a range of diﬀerent 
police districts with diﬀering populations, crime proﬁles and resources. Budapest’s 6th 
District covers a busy city-center area and includes Budapest’s main railway station. 
Szeged, with a population of 200,000, is a medium-sized district on the Romanian 
border. Kaposvár is a relatively rural police district with 120,000 inhabitants. There 
were also some project activities that took place outside of the pilot sites, like the study 
tour to the UK. 
The project consisted of the following main components:
a) Project preparation
 Examination of existing law, policy, and practice regarding ID checks;7 drafting and 
ﬁnalization of a cooperative agreement with the project partners, which included 
obtaining approval from the relevant Parliamentary Commissioners (see below)
b) Study tour to the UK
c) Technical preparation of the monitoring phase 
 Development of an ID check form for the purposes of the STEPSS project in Hungary; 
creation of operational guidelines for police oﬃcers conducting or supervising ID checks
d) Training of police oﬃcers participating in the project
e) ID check monitoring 
 Completion of stop forms and civilian monitoring, analysis of the resulting data
f ) Evaluation 
 Interviewing of participating police oﬃcers and monitors
There were more tasks to be performed beyond the listed activities, but in the ﬁnal 
report we only deal with the most important ones.
2.3.1 Project preparation
The implementation of the STEPSS program in Hungary closely followed the outline 
set forth for all STEPSS partners. Following an early period of partner identiﬁcation 
(with particular focus on recruiting community and academic partners), the national 
7 The audit was the result of the joint eﬀort of the NPH, the HPC and the HHC, and provided a 
comprehensive analysis of all aspects of ID checks. Its edited version is available on the HHC’s website 
(www.helsinki.hu).
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coordinator carried out a review audit of existing law and police practice in the ﬁeld 
of stop and search in close cooperation with the NPH and the HPC. This was done in 
order to be better able to identify the gaps in written procedures, as well as in oﬃcer 
conduct. The analysis was prepared in all three project countries on the basis of a ques-
tionnaire compiled by the international project management.
At this stage it was necessary to obtain approval from the relevant Parliamentary 
Commissioners. According to the Data Protection Act (Act LXIII of 1992 on the 
Protection of Personal Data and Publicity of Data of Public Interest), data related to 
ethnic aﬃliation or origin are regarded as sensitive data which can only be lawfully 
processed if an Act of Parliament permits, or the person concerned gives his/her written 
consent to processing the data.8 As such, police oﬃcers were not, and are not autho-
rized by law to process data of ethnic origin during the course of conducting ID checks. 
Nor would it have been practical for the police to ask for consent during the stop. The 
research, however, could only have been representative if all of the individuals in ques-
tion agreed to have their data processed. It was essential for the purposes of the project, 
then, to ﬁnd a lawful way to record the ethnic origin of each person who underwent an 
ID check at the pilot sites. 
The solution that seemed most feasible was for the oﬃcers to record the perceived 
ethnicity of the person on a separate and anonymous STEPSS form. These forms were 
to be stored separately from the standard ID check forms that the police have a legal 
obligation to complete. After each shift the oﬃcers who performed ID checks handed 
over the STEPSS forms they had ﬁlled out to the appointed contact person who at the 
end of each week forwarded the collected forms to the NPH, from where it was sent to 
the HHC. The HHC’s statistician entered the data into a coded data base, after which 
the forms were eliminated. 
This way, any possibility of restoring a link between the data and the individual with 
regard to whom the data have been recorded is impossible, so the sensitive data cannot 
be linked to the data owner. The data therefore ceases to be personal, becoming 
mere statistical information. The police requested approval from the Data Protection 
Commissioner and the Minority Rights Commissioner, as this method had never 
been used before the project. The commissioners accepted our proposed methodology, 
holding that the solution raises no data protection concerns.  
8 Articles 2 (1) and 3 (2) of the Data Protection Act. 
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2.3.2 Study tour to the UK
The STEPSS Hungary partners (captains of the police units at the pilot sites, civilian 
monitors, designated contacts at the NPH and the HPC, and the HHC’s project coor-
dinator) accompanied their counterparts from Spain and Bulgaria on a UK study tour 
in April 2007. There they were able to assess stop and search procedures and moni-
toring programs that were developed in the United Kingdom. The partners participated 
in training sessions, including ride-alongs with the London and Leicester police forces, 
met with British community leaders, and, perhaps most importantly, came together 
as a team to discuss the national implications of carrying out the STEPSS project in 
Hungary. The relationships forged among the Hungarian team during the UK study 
tour set the stage for future intense cooperation among the diﬀerent partners in the 
three pilot sites. 
2.3.3 Technical preparation of the monitoring phase
According to Hungarian law, police oﬃcers are not always obliged to ﬁll out oﬃcial 
forms after ID checks. Even when they do ﬁll them out, the standard forms do not 
contain all the data that was relevant to the project and the oﬃcial forms are obvi-
ously not anonymous. Therefore a new, so-called “STEPSS form” was designed by local 
police forces, the NPH and the HHC (that was used parallel with the oﬃcial forms).
The STEPSS ID check form used in Hungary contained the following data:9
 time of ID check,
 place of ID check,
 gender of concerned person,
 age of concerned person,
 grounds for ID check,
 results of ID check,
 perceived ethnicity of the person concerned, established by the oﬃcer,
 civil monitor’s remark.
In designing the form the most diﬃcult task was the compilation of a list of the typical 
reasons for ID checks. On the one hand, the list needed to be simple, short and easily 
understandable so that the form can be ﬁlled out easily and quickly. On the other hand, 
however, the reasons needed to be detailed enough to justify the necessity of a concrete 
9 For the complete ID check form see Annex 1.
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measure. The list of typical reasons for ID checks was prepared by the NPH, and was 
the following: 
1) Possession of a suspicious object: this reason had to be marked by patrolling oﬃcers 
when they ID checked a citizen on the belief that he/she possessed an object that 
was stolen. When marking this reason, the oﬃcer had to expand on the reasons for 
believing that the person concerned might have possessed such an object. 
2) Intensive control: ID checks carried out for this purpose needed not to be justiﬁed 
as in light of the internal decision issued by a superior everyone needs to be or may 
ID checked in the territory covered by the intensive control, irrespective of the 
existence of the individual circumstances that in other cases may justify ID checks. 
However, in such cases oﬃcers were obliged to indicate the objective of the inten-
sive control and the number of the internal decision ordering the control. 
3) Traﬃc control: no further justiﬁcation was required, only the type and age of the 
given car had to be written on the form. 
4) Security measure: this measure is applied in order to put an end to a situation 
dangerous to oneself or directly endangering other persons or valuables. In this case 
the situation causing the danger and the role of the person checked needed to be 
described. 
5) Finding a wanted person: if checking this reason the police oﬃcer was required 
to explain what made him/her believe that the person concerned was a wanted 
person. 
6) Suspicion of a crime: if marking this reason the oﬃcer needed to explain shortly why 
he/she had thought that the ID checked person committed a crime. 
7) Suspicion of petty oﬀence: if marking this reason the oﬃcer needed to explain shortly 
why he/she had thought that the ID checked person committed a petty oﬀence. 
8) Prevention of an act jeopardizing public order: if marking this reason the oﬃcer had 
to describe the act jeopardizing public order and the concerned person’s role in it. 
9) Possession of legally prohibited object: in this case the oﬃcer had to describe the 
reasons for believing that the concerned person possessed a legally prohibited object 
(for instance, a ﬁrearm possessed without an appropriate permit).
10) Other reason, namely: when none of the reasons listed above was the one necessi-
tating the given ID check the oﬃcer had to explain the actual reason on the form. 
When asking about the result of the ID check, we wished to know whether the check 
was followed by further police measures, such as the arrest of a person under an arrest 
warrant, the short-term arrest of the person checked, or the initiation of petty oﬀence 
proceedings. We decided to include this question upon the presumption that if a check 
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is followed by any of the above outcomes, the police action must have had a proper 
basis, and this is how we tried to assess whether the number of the checks conducted 
in the pilot sites are proportionate to the results achieved (for more details on this, see 
Chapter 3).
The forms were designed to: 
 detect any disproportionate treatment in stops of minority citizens,
 chart how stops are being used by oﬃcers (reasons for stops, suspicion, location, 
outcomes), and
 provide a tool for enhanced supervision.
Supervision was an important part of the project design. At the end of each shift, oﬃ-
cers were required to hand over the completed forms to their supervising oﬃcer. The 
supervisor then was to check whether the number of ID check forms corresponded 
to the number of checks that the patrolling oﬃcers logged in their daily report. They 
further reviewed whether the content of the forms was satisfactory, especially focusing 
on the reasons for conducting the ID checks. The supervisor was also under an obliga-
tion to separate STEPSS forms from any other documents which might link a person’s 
perceived ethnicity to their identiﬁable personal data.
The HHC and the NPH have also prepared operational guidelines where the police 
oﬃcers involved in the project (be they patrolling oﬃcers or supervisors) could ﬁnd all 
the rules related to the project. The operational guidelines were designed to be short and 
easily understandable, and contained the project rules broken down by the following 
topics:
 The reasons for carrying out the STEPSS project10
 How to conduct ID checks in the context of the STEPSS program
 Practical information on how to ﬁll out the forms
 The rights and obligations of civilian monitors
 Rules of data processing
 Rules of internal control
10 It was essential to thoroughly explain to the oﬃcers that the aim of the project was not to scrutinize 
their work and sanction them if any discrimination were revealed. They needed to understand that 
the project goals centered instead on getting a realistic view of what they do in their normal work day, 
and on the basis of the ﬁndings, to come up with recommendations to improve the system.
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2.3.4 Training of police oﬃcers participating in the project
The training of police oﬃcers was divided into two parts. There was a one-day training 
organized for supervisors and higher-ranking police oﬃcers employed at the police 
units. Civilian monitors were also invited to this training. The presentations outlined 
the rules of the STEPSS project, and shared the results of previous research into ethnic 
proﬁling by the Hungarian police. General problems within the Hungarian policing 
system were discussed, including how the eﬃciency of police ID check practice could 
be improved. Most of the presentations were held by practicing police oﬃcers, based on 
the notion that “unusual” ideas would seem more palatable if presented by colleagues, 
rather than by human rights lawyers. 
All of the other patrolling oﬃcers were trained in the course of their regular brieﬁngs. 
The training of some 300 oﬃcers had to be thus staged due to the necessity of main-
taining a constant police presence on the streets. Altogether, the HHC held six presenta-
tions at the pilot sites, with two events per site. The oﬃcers were ultimately not adverse 
to the presentations given by human rights lawyers, as they said that the extra burden 
of having to ﬁll out another form was bearable. They seemed to have understood the 
objectives and the rules of the project.
2.3.5 Monitoring ID checks through the completion of stop forms and 
civilian monitoring 
Oﬃcers began ﬁlling out of the forms on 17 September 2007 and continued to do so 
for six months. During this period the HHC’s project coordinator maintained regular 
contact with the local police units and the civilian monitors. After two months, the 
HHC analyzed the ﬁrst pack of completed forms. It was at this time that the need for 
further clariﬁcation and communication became clear. Although the higher-ranking 
oﬃcers seemed to understand the rationale behind the project, part of the operational 
staﬀ were apparently reluctant to ﬁll out the forms. It was not clear to each of them 
what exactly they should have written down as grounds for an ID check. The forms 
were accordingly adjusted, and a new round of training was held for the patrolling oﬃ-
cers. The training now included a list of typical acceptable and unacceptable grounds 
for an ID check; the emphasis being on real life examples of proper justiﬁcations. 
Besides gathering data through standardized forms, the practice of ID checks was also 
monitored through the involvement of civilian monitors. We tried to involve into this 
activity people who are key minority representatives in their respective regions. Imre 
Bogdán is the president of the local minority self-government of Kaposvár, Zsolt Virág 
is the president of the Szeged minority self-government, while Jenő Setét is the execu-
tive director of the Roma Civil Rights Foundation (one of the most inﬂuential Roma 
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NGOs in Hungary). The civilian monitors joined patrolling police oﬃcers 36 times 
during the project period (for a summary of their observations see Chapter 5). 
2.3.6 Analyzing the data
For a detailed description of the methodology used in the data collection and the subse-
quent analysis, see Annex 2. The results of the analysis are presented in Chapter 3 
below.
2.3.7 Evaluation
After the forms were completed and collected, the international project coordinator 
and members of the HHC staﬀ interviewed several oﬃcers and civilian monitors who 
participated in the implementation phase of the project. Their feedback was recorded, 
and a summary of the observations can be found below, in Chapters 4 and 5.
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3.  Analysis of the Research Data
3.1 Number of stops
During the six months of STEPSS data collection (17 September 2007 – 17 March 
2008), the three Hungarian police units participating in the project performed alto-
gether approximately 36,939 ID checks.11 Of these stops, 22,375 were recorded on the 
forms developed as part of the STEPSS project.  
Table 1: Overall data of ID checks within the project period
Area Number 
of stops
Percentage 
of total
Number of forms
completed
Percentage 
of total
Percentage of forms compared 
to total number of checks
Budapest 3,033* 8% 2,015 8% 66%
Kaposvár 22,089* 60% 13,506** 53% 61%
Szeged 11,817* 32% 9,934** 39% 84%
Total 36,939* 100% 25,455** 100% 69%
* Adjusted ﬁgure
** Hypothetical ﬁgure (for explanation, see Annex 2).
11 This is an adjusted ﬁgure: for an explanation, see Annex 2.
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Graph 1: Number of ID checks
The data shows large diﬀerences in the numbers of stops conducted by the three police 
departments. The variation is especially conspicuous between Szeged and Kaposvár, 
since the latter produced a consistently higher number of checks even though its popu-
lation is substantially smaller.
The Head of the Kaposvár Department for Public Order gave two possible explanations 
for this phenomenon: ﬁrstly, if more police oﬃcers participate in an ID check, each of 
them reports the measure to the duty commander in his/her daily report. In practice 
this means that the same ID check might appear more than once in the statistics. This 
distortion is in all probability not independent of the other explanation, namely the 
great emphasis put on “screening” and “mapping” by the Kaposvár Police Headquarters, 
in accordance with the expectations of the county headquarters. Thus, the high number 
of checks may be attributed to both the policing style prevalent in the county and the 
method for data collection. While the particular approach in Kaposvár may have been 
devised to produce results satisfying expectations at the county level, it does not seem to 
be more eﬃcient than styles relying on checks to a lesser degree (see below).
Overall, the numbers indicated in Table 1 represent a decrease in the number of ID 
checks on the previous year. In Budapest, there was a drastic, 75.3% decrease in ID 
checks compared to the same period in the preceding year (14,362 to 3,538). In Szeged, 
the total number of such measures dropped by 17.5% compared to the same period 
in the previous year (16,724 to 13,786), while in Kaposvár there was a slight (4.7%) 
increase (24,606 to 25,770). 
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It is likely that this decrease in overall stop numbers reﬂects a number of factors. One 
of these is the general loss of conﬁdence on the part of the police, which, according 
to a number of oﬃcers asked during the project evaluation, started with the widely 
publicized instances of excessive use of force during the riots of October 2006. As a 
result, there has been a decrease in police activity throughout the whole country. The 
low morale and lack of public trust in the police were repeatedly mentioned during the 
evaluation interviews for the project. 
The decrease in ID checks in Szeged and Budapest (6th District) during the project 
period may also reﬂect the increased administrative workload on the oﬃcers (the ﬁlling 
out of the form). This is substantiated by the fact that in Budapest the decrease was 
radical (over 70%) compared to the same period in the previous year, but after the 
monitoring phase was over, the monthly average of ID checks increased by 25%.
When asked about the possible explanation for the trends and numbers, the inter-
viewed police oﬃcers did not mention the January 2008 amendment of the Police Act 
(prescribing the conditions of ID checks with greater detail than before the modiﬁca-
tion). The following were identiﬁed as factors inﬂuencing the number of checks: (i) the 
use of personnel for other purposes (e.g. tasks related to the order of demonstrations), 
meaning less oﬃcers on the streets and accordingly less checks;12 (ii) intensive control 
was ordered around the Christmas holidays;13 (iii) events attracting larger crowds;14 
(iv) ordering of speciﬁc actions (e.g. intensive controls) for diﬀerent reasons;15 (v) the 
number of oﬃcers on leave in the given period;16 (vi) the weather conditions;17 (vii) 
others tasks (e.g. tasks related to demonstrations, shooting practice, training tasks, 
physical tests).18 
12 Budapest 6th District. 
13 Budapest 6th District.
14 Szeged.
15 Szeged.
16 Kaposvár.
17 Kaposvár.
18 Kaposvár.
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Table 2: The proportion of ID checks in relation to the population
Place Number of stops* Estimated population Number of stops 
per 1,000 population per year
Budapest19 6,065 65,000 93
Kaposvár20 44,177 122,000 362
Szeged21 23,633 203,000 116
* Estimated annual number
The table above represents the number of people stopped per 1,000 (estimated) local 
population. In Budapest, there are 93 ID checks per 1,000, in Kaposvár 353 ID checks 
per 1,000 and in Szeged 147 ID checks per 1,000 population. 
As noted earlier in the report, ID checks in Hungary involve not only discretionary 
stops on the street of those suspected of committing a crime, but also checks of people 
that witness crimes and accidents, report something to the police or ask for help, etc. 
When asked about the approximate proportion of such checks (i.e. checks not initiated 
by the police), diﬀerent estimations were given by the competent police oﬃcers: 10% in 
Kaposvár, 20% in Szeged and 30% in Budapest. If we adjust the above numbers using 
this data, we still get very high numbers: 65 checks per 1,000 population in Budapest, 
325 in Kaposvár, and 93 in Szeged.
To put this into an international context, the police in the UK conducted 59 stops 
(stop and search plus stop and account measures) per 1,000 population during the years 
2006–2007.22 The average annual number of stops per 1,000 population in the three 
Spanish project sites was even less: 16. Thus, ID checks play a much more important 
role in the Hungarian police’s relations with the general public than it is the case in 
other European countries.
19 An estimate of the population covered by the Budapest 6th District Police Headquarters is hard to 
establish as it covers an inner-city area that includes one of the city’s three main railway stations, 
shops, oﬃces, restaurants, residents and a transient population that enters the district. The registered 
population is about 39,000, but we based our calculations on a population of 65,000 in order to take 
into consideration the people visiting this district. The estimation is based on approximate ﬁgures 
provided by Zsolt Akács, Head of the Department for Public Order at the Budapest 6th District Police 
Headquarters. 
20 Population of the Greater Kaposvár Region. Source: KSH Népességtudományi Kutató Intézet, 
Előreszámítási adatbázis, 2003 (http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.php?m=830&id=566).
21 Population of the Greater Szeged Region. Source: http://www.icicom.hu/teruletfo/csmhu15.htm.
22 Jones, A. and Singer, L.: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – 2006/7, London, Ministry 
of Justice, 2008.
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3.2 Effectiveness
The eﬀectiveness of ID checks can be determined by examining what percentage of ID 
checks are followed by further police measures (such as arresting a person based on a 
warrant, initiating criminal or petty oﬀence proceedings, etc.). This is often referred 
to as the “hit” or “success” rate. The project identiﬁed three main types of follow-up 
procedures (i.e. positive results proving that the check had a proper ground): (a) arrests, 
(b) short-term arrests and (c) petty oﬀence procedures initiated (including on-the-spot 
ﬁnes). Arrest and short-term arrests are regulated by the Police Act, which obliges an 
oﬃcer to take into custody someone who is caught in the act of committing a cri-
minal oﬀence, or against whom an arrest warrant has been issued (arrest). The act gives 
the oﬃcer the authority to take into custody, among others, someone who refuses to 
identify himself/herself, may be suspected of having committed a criminal oﬀence or 
someone who continues a petty oﬀence in deﬁance of police instructions (short-term 
arrest).23 Petty oﬀences are quasi-criminal oﬀences, the gravity of which does not reach 
the criminal level (i.e. they are not regulated in the Criminal Code). Petty oﬀences 
range between oﬀences that are punishable by a 60-day incarceration, such as prostitu-
tion or physical threats, to those punishable by less severe measures (e.g. a ﬁne, conﬁsca-
tion of goods, or ban on entering certain events). Examples for such oﬀences are petty 
theft or traﬃc infractions.24
 
It is important to note that in a large number of cases, ID checks form an inevitable part 
of the petty oﬀence procedure and are not necessarily the starting point. For example, 
if an oﬃcer is witness to an unlawful action, he/she needs to establish the identity of 
the perpetrator in order to impose an on-the-spot ﬁne on the perpetrator or initiate a 
23 Under Article 33 (1) of the Police Act, the oﬃcer shall arrest and present before the competent 
authority the person (a) who is caught in the act of committing a criminal oﬀence; (b) against whom 
an arrest warrant has been issued. In terms of Paragraph (2) of the same provision, the oﬃcer may take 
into short-term arrest a person (a) who upon the call of the police is unable to identify himself/herself 
or refuses to do so; (b) who may be suspected of having committed a criminal oﬀence; (c) whose blood 
or urinary sample needs to be taken in order to substantiate the committing of a criminal oﬀence or 
petty oﬀence; (d) who, in deﬁance of police instructions, continues a petty oﬀence, or with regard to 
whom the petty oﬀence proceeding may be conducted immediately, or from whom a piece of material 
evidence or an object that may be conﬁscated must be acquired.
24 A certain behavior may be qualiﬁed as a petty oﬀence by a law (i.e. an Act of Parliament), a govern-
mental decree or a decree issued by a local council. According to Act LXIX of 1999 on Petty Oﬀences 
(Petty Oﬀences Act), the local notary, the police, the customs oﬃce and other so-called “petty oﬀence 
authorities” are entitled to proceed in these cases. If a petty oﬀence is punishable with incarceration, 
only courts may adjudicate it (and the decision can be appealed), otherwise the competent petty 
oﬀence authority (including the police) decides on the case, though judicial review is possible.
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petty-oﬀence proceeding. In this case the result (the proceeding) is not generated by 
the ID check (as opposed to the identiﬁcation of a person subject to an arrest warrant, 
where the result, the identiﬁcation and arrest of the person is the result of the check). 
It is not possible, however, to distinguish between these two forms of ID checks within 
the framework of the project, so we regarded all ID checks coming out of petty oﬀence 
procedures as positive results (i.e. results substantiating that the ID check must have 
been well-founded).
During the project, a number of oﬃcers raised that when examining the eﬀectiveness of 
ID checks, it also must be taken into consideration that checks have a general preven-
tive eﬀect, and may in speciﬁc cases even be suitable for preventing speciﬁc criminal 
oﬀences: if for instance someone is preparing to commit a burglary, and is stopped and 
checked by the police, he/she will most probably give up on the plan, as the fact that the 
police will know where the given person was at a particular time, signiﬁcantly increases 
the chance of being identiﬁed. The oﬃcers acknowledge that this impact may not be 
measured as accurately as the number of follow-up measures (since it is not possible to 
measure how many oﬀences were not committed), but they insist that this eﬀect shall 
be taken into account when we speak about eﬃciency.
It needs to be pointed out that the preventive eﬀect of ID checks has never been 
measured and proven in Hungary. According to foreign experts researching the issue, 
the potential perpetrator checked this way will not completely give up the plan of 
committing a criminal act, he/she will only modify it: he/she will commit an oﬀence 
in a diﬀerent place, or will commit the originally planned oﬀence at a later time. 
A comprehensive British research into stop and search measures25 established that such 
police action decreases the number of oﬀences by only 0.2–2.3%, and no close correla-
tion may be substantiated between the number of checks and the number of those types 
of oﬀences that may in theory be inﬂuenced by checks.26
The results of the checks performed within the time span of the project (and recorded 
on the project forms) are summarized below.
25 Miller, J., Bland, N. and Quinton, P.: The Impact of Stops and Searches on Crime and Community, 
In: Police Research Series, 127, 2000, p. VI.
26 We may presume the existence of a preventive impact in relation to petty theft and traﬃcking in 
drugs, but no such eﬀect may be presumed in connection with white collar crime, so only statistics on 
certain types of oﬀences are relevant from this point of view.
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Graph 2: Result of ID checks
Overall, including traﬃc related checks,27 only 1% of ID checks led to an arrest, 2% 
led to a short term arrest and 18% to petty oﬀence procedures. Put simply, out of every 
100 persons ID checked, only two were taken into short-term arrest, and only one 
was arrested.28 On the whole it appears that the police use of ID checks is ineﬀective; 
large numbers of people are being inconvenienced by the police for ID checks, with 
little result. This data refutes the argument that extensive checks are an eﬃcient tool 
against criminality, and highlights the sheer amount of police time wasted conducting 
ID checks.  
This conclusion is further substantiated by the local data the participating headquarters 
provided after the monitoring phase was complete: in Kaposvár, where the number 
of ID checks increased during the project period compared to the same period in the 
previous year, the results were not any better. In contrast, although the number of 
checks dropped during the project period in both Szeged and Budapest, eﬃciency did 
not decrease (and even increased in some respects).
The results are outlined below.
Petty offence procedure
18%
No further measure 
was required
79%
Arrest
1%
Short-term arrest
2%
27 If ID checks related to traﬃc oﬀences are removed, the remaining ID checks result in 2% arrest, 3% 
short-term arrest, 19% petty oﬀence procedure and 76% no further action taken.
28 To put this in an international context, in the UK nationally 10–13% of stop and searches lead 
to arrest. See: Jones, A. and Singer, L.: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – 2006/7, 
London, Ministry of Justice, 2008.
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Kaposvár
As outlined above, in Kaposvár a slight (4.7%) increase in the total number of ID 
checks was detected (24,606 to 25,770) compared to the same period in the previous 
year. Furthermore, the number of checks showed a steady increase throughout the 
project period. As for procedures related to the checks, see Graphs 3–6.
Graph 3: Kaposvár: Number of checks over the pilot period and the previous year
Graph 4: Kaposvár: Initiation of petty oﬀence proceedings
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Graph 5: Kaposvár: Number of short-term arrests
Graph 6: Kaposvár: Number of persons subject to an arrest warrant who were identiﬁed 
  and taken into custody
In Kaposvár we can see that the increase in the number of ID checks did not bring 
about an increase in follow-up procedures. In fact, there was a 42% drop in the number 
of persons with outstanding arrest warrants who were identiﬁed and taken into custody 
during the project period (104 to 58), and a 30% decrease in short-term arrests (601 
to 408). 
This again refutes the idea that more ID checks necessarily lead to more tangible results, 
which is substantiated by our own research results. 
Szeged
In Szeged the total number of ID checks dropped by 17.5% (16,724 to 13,786) when 
compared to the same period in the previous year. The measures resulting from the 
checks are summarized below (Graphs 7–11).
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Graph 7: Szeged: Number of checks over the pilot period and the previous year
Graph 8: Szeged: Initiation of petty oﬀence proceedings
Graph 9: Szeged: Number of ﬁnes imposed on the scene
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Graph 10: Szeged: Number of short-term arrests
Graph 11: Szeged: Number of persons subject to an arrest warrant who were identiﬁed 
  and taken into custody
In Szeged, the number of checks decreased most conspicuously in October, December 
and January (with 35%, 30% and 40%, respectively). At the same time, overall eﬃ-
ciency seems to have increased. Although less petty oﬀence proceedings were initiated 
(3,036 instead of 3,361) and less ﬁnes were imposed on the spot (2,718 as opposed to 
3,630), the number of short-term arrests and the number of persons with an outstanding 
warrant who were identiﬁed and taken into custody slightly increased (605 to 611 and 
148 to 163, respectively). The Head of the Department for Public Order attributed 
the increase in the number of wanted persons taken into custody to the setting up of 
a specialized search unit whose sole purpose is to ﬁnd and arrest wanted persons. The 
unit is not using ID checks as a general screening method; instead it applies checks in 
a strictly targeted manner. This methodology seems to be a much more eﬃcient use of 
police time and energy, and also creates less tension by inconveniencing fewer people. 
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Budapest 6th District
In the 6th District of Budapest there was a drastic, 75.3% decrease in ID checks compared 
to the same period in the preceding year (14,362 to 3,538). The follow-up results are 
summarized below (Graphs 12–16).
Graph 12: Budapest: Number of checks over the pilot period and the previous year
In Budapest, the radical 75% drop in the number of checks did not bring about a 
similar decrease in relation to the follow-up measures. Besides providing the monthly 
ﬁgures for the period between 1 September 2007 and 31 March 2008, the Head of the 
Department for Public Order also provided exact numbers for the entire project period. 
During the project’s span, 2,242 petty oﬀence proceedings were initiated, as opposed to 
977 such measures for the same period in the previous year. In other words, although 
the number of ID checks dropped by over 50%, more than twice as many ID checks 
were followed by petty oﬀence proceedings.  
Graph 13: Budapest: Initiation of petty oﬀence proceedings
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Graph 14: Budapest: Number of ﬁnes imposed on the scene
Graph 15: Budapest: Number of short-term arrests
Graph 16: Budapest: Number of persons subject to an arrest warrant who were identiﬁed 
  and taken into custody
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The number of short-term arrests remained approximately the same, representing a 
statistically insigniﬁcant increase relative to the same period in the previous year: during 
the project period 692 persons were taken into custody, compared to 683 in the same 
period of the preceding year. The only area where a drastic decrease in the number 
of checks seems to have resulted in a decrease in eﬀectiveness is the identiﬁcation of 
persons subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. During the project period 284 such 
persons were identiﬁed and arrested, as opposed to 317 in the previous year, equivalent 
to a 10% drop. 
In sum, the decrease in the number of ID checks in Szeged and Budapest did not result 
in a signiﬁcant decrease in eﬃciency (there was a decrease in relation to some of the 
follow-up measures, whereas in relation to other measures the levels remained the same 
or even increased). At a minimum, we can conclude that the data does not substantiate 
a correlation between the number of checks and the measurable success of police work 
(the argument that is used most frequently to justify the current practice of extensively 
checking people). 
It is noteworthy that there is signiﬁcant variation in the rate of eﬃciency depending 
upon what ground was recorded as the basis for the ID check. As outlined earlier, the 
acting oﬃcers had to indicate on the form on what grounds they initiated the measure. 
The graph below shows the distribution of checks on the basis of their grounds.
Graph 17: Grounds of ID checks (including traﬃc stops)
As it can be seen, most ID checks, 37%, took place during the course of traﬃc controls. 
A relatively high proportion of checks, 19%, were based upon the suspicion of a petty 
oﬀence, 8% of all checks were pursuant to intensive controls, and only 2% of checks 
were related to the suspicion of a criminal act. ID checks recorded under the “other” 
Other 32.5%
Suspicious object 0.2% Intensive controll 8%
Traffic control 37%
Security measure 0.4%
Finding wanted person 0.5%Suspicion of crime 2%
Suspicion of petty offence 19%
Prevention of an act jeopardizing 
public order 0.3%
Possession of legally prohibited object 0.1%
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category make up a third of all stops; this proportion rises to 50% when we removed 
traﬃc control stops from the data.
When we examine the eﬃciency rate of the ID checks relative to their diﬀerent grounds, 
we see that the most frequently quoted grounds are the least eﬃcient.
Graph 18: Eﬃciency of ID checks broken down by grounds of check
Arrests and signiﬁcant percentages of short-term arrests only followed those ID checks 
that were related to the suspicion of a crime, petty oﬀence or ﬁnding a wanted person.29 
Out of these latter cases, however, only those checks that were initiated due to the suspi-
cion of a petty oﬀence made up a substantial portion of all the checks. 
Overall, traﬃc control constituted the largest reason for the ID checks, though in 84% 
of these cases no further action was taken. 
Two very important conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, intensive control seems to be 
very ineﬃcient. Intensive control (as it was mentioned above, in Section 2.2.1) refers 
to checks that are not based on an oﬃcer’s own discretion, but rather upon an order 
from a superior who deﬁnes the permissible parameters. The aim of ID checks under 
29 From the graph it seems that checks initiated in relation to security measures also have a high success 
rate, but the actual number of security measures in the sample was so low (16) that no conclusion 
could be drawn with regard to the general eﬃciency of checks initiated on this ground.
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intensive control may be to arrest a criminal suspect, or prevent or frustrate an action or 
incident posing a threat to public safety. ID checks in such cases are limited to checking 
persons who are at, or who are entering into a certain area or publicly accessible place. 
Only 6% of checks performed on the basis of an intensive control order were followed 
up by any measure.
The second area of concern involves ID checks conducted based on the “other” ground, 
which has an overall hit rate of 9% (0.6% arrest, 2% short-term arrest, and 7% petty 
oﬀence procedure). When asked to provide a speciﬁc reason or suspicion for checks 
falling into this category, many oﬃcers failed to articulate any concrete grounds for the 
check. 
Graph 19: Level of concreteness in cases when reason for check was identiﬁed as “other”
In 64% of these cases oﬃcers provided no information at all, and in 20% of all the cases 
the information provided was regarded as unsatisfactory (in a lot of cases for instance, 
the oﬃcers ﬁlling out the forms indicated “general ID check” as the actual reason, 
which violates the Hungarian Police Act, as it requires ID checks to have a speciﬁc iden-
tiﬁable purpose). In only 16% of the checks based on the ground “other” did the acting 
oﬃcers provide information that the analysts found acceptable, e.g. “seemed disturbed 
when sensed police presence”.30 
Since the majority of the checks (outside traﬃc control) belonged to the “other” cate-
gory, we can conclude that those checks which do not have any particular, concrete 
ground are at the same time the most ineﬃcient with very poor hit rates. This refutes 
30 We have to note that when we said “acceptable” we did not try to assess whether the reason given was 
in accordance with the law. Instead, we considered whether it reached a level of concreteness at which 
it was possible to reconstruct, on the basis of the information provided, why the oﬃcer might have 
thought that the given person had to be checked. 
No reason given 64%
Concrete 16%
Non-concrete 20%
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the thesis that it is worth putting police time and work into performing ID checks on 
a random basis.
Besides the police’s relationship with minorities (see below) and the community as 
a whole the eﬃcient use of police resources was the most important aspect of our 
research. If we calculate ﬁve minutes per ID check on average, the 1.4 million indepen-
dently initiated checks performed annually amount to approximately 233,400 working 
hours (as regularly not only one, but two police oﬃcers carry out ID checks), adding up 
to 29,175 working days per year. On the basis of the average monthly salary of police 
oﬃcers (HUF 242,500 gross), this means that the time spent on ID checks is worth 
over HUF 335 million annually. With a hit rate of about 20%, the mass use of ID 
checks seems to be an ineﬃcient use of human and ﬁnancial resources.
3.3 Ethnic disproportionality
3.3.1 Over-representation of Roma in the ID checked population
Based on the data collected through the forms, it appears that the majority of ID checks 
take place on public premises (streets, parks and roads account for 78%), while rela-
tively few checks are performed in pubs, discos or similar places (6%). The temporal 
distribution of the checks is relatively even, with 21% occurring in the morning (from 
6 a.m. till noon), 29% in the afternoon (from noon till 6 p.m.), 30% in the evening 
(from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m.), and the remaining 20% at night.
Police oﬃcers stop and check more men than women (75% and 25% respectively), 
and in line with international trends, young people are more likely to be checked. 
Individuals belonging to the age group 14–29 represent 43% of all checks, whereas 
their ratio within the population is 22%.31
Based on the overall data collected, police in Hungary are most likely to check young 
men between the ages 14–29.
The data also shows that Roma are disproportionately targeted for ID checks. 
Disproportionality in ID checks refers to the extent to which police powers are applied 
to diﬀerent ethnic/nationality groups out of proportion with their relative ratios in 
the wider population. The data provides evidence of disproportionality in stops by 
31 Based on the ﬁgures of the 2001 census, see: www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/18/tables/load1_
12.html.
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comparing the rate at which people from diﬀerent ethnic or nationality groups are 
stopped versus the majority group. Within the framework of the project, 22% of all 
persons checked by the police were of Roma origin (according to the assessment of the 
oﬃcer performing the check), as opposed to 75% being identiﬁed as “Caucasian” by 
the acting oﬃcer.32 The remaining 3% were identiﬁed as “Black”, “Asian”, “Arab” or 
other. It should be noted that according to reliable sociological research, the estimated 
proportion of Roma people within the total Hungarian population (of 10,045,000) is 
much lower: approximately 6.2% of the population (i.e. their actual number is around 
620,000).33 Thus, Roma are more than three times more likely to be stopped than their 
percentage of the general population would suggest. 
Graph 20: The concerned person was seen by the police as:
Black 1%
Asian 0.1%
Caucasian 75%
Roma 22%
Other 1.5% Arab 0.4%
32 We reﬁned the results further to remove stops conducted for the purpose of traﬃc control on the 
assumption that it is more diﬃcult to make racially grounded distinctions when police oﬃcers stop 
cars on the road. With traﬃc stops removed, the percentage of Roma is somewhat higher (25%), but 
the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. The reason for this may be that since there are types of cars 
that are typically driven by Roma, ethnic proﬁling is not necessarily impossible during traﬃc stops. 
Our attempt to control if the type and age of a vehicle may also inﬂuence the choices of police oﬃcers 
was not successful. However, our data provides evidence that such proﬁling may exist. We examined 
what the percentages of Roma and non-Roma were among those who were checked during traﬃc 
controls, and found that the percentage of Roma within this sample was 17%. This is below the 22% 
level of over-representation within the full sample, but still signiﬁcantly exceeds the national ratio 
of Roma within Hungary. It also needs to be taken into consideration that car ownership is likely to 
be rarer among the Roma due to their indigence and marginalized position in society. So while the 
level of proﬁling is lower when traﬃc stops are performed (probably due in part to the fact that it is 
more diﬃcult to make racial distinctions in such a situation), a certain disproportionality may still 
be observed. This also explains why the diﬀerences between results with and without traﬃc stops are 
smaller than previously expected. 
33 Hablicsek, L., Gyenei, M. and Kemény, I.: Kísérleti számítások a roma lakosság területi jellemzőinek 
alakulására és 2021-ig történő előrebecslésére, p. 63. See: http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.php?p=605&
m=1003 (hereafter: Hablicsek).
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The results show that Roma youth are especially likely to be targeted for ID checks. 
As is described in the chart below, the proportion of Roma youth between age 14 
and 16 who were ID checked during the project period was signiﬁcantly higher than 
the already high general representation of Roma within the sample (32% as opposed 
to 22%). In interpreting the data we have to take into consideration the fact that the 
Roma population proﬁle is younger than that of the wider Hungarian population. The 
age group 15–19, for instance, is estimated to represent 10.3% of the total Roma popu-
lation, as opposed to 6.4% within the total population.34 
Graph 21: Age of concerned person broken down by ethnicity
There is some diﬀerence between the three pilot sites in relation to disproportionality. 
Graph 22: Site of ID check (including traﬃc stops)
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34 See Kemény, I.: A magyarországi cigány népesség demográﬁája (http://www.demograﬁa.hu/Demo
graﬁa/2004_3-4/Kemeny%20Istvan_kozl.pdf ).
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In Budapest, one third (33%) of the persons checked were identiﬁed as Roma; they were 
approximately 3.3 times more likely to be stopped and ID checked than non-Roma.35 
Of those who were ID checked in Szeged during the project period, 7% were identiﬁed 
as Roma, although the percentage of Roma within the total population of the covered 
region is only 3%.36 This means that a Roma person is approximately 2.3 times more 
likely to be stopped and ID checked than a non-Roma.
In Kaposvár, 29% of those ID checked were identiﬁed as being of Roma origin, whereas 
the percentage of Roma within the total population of the region is 15%.37 This means 
that a Roma person is approximately twice as likely to be stopped and ID checked than 
a non-Roma. The results are worse when we exclude traﬃc controls from the results: 
the percentage of Roma among those who were ID checked subsequently rises to 36%; 
meaning that a Roma person is 2.4 times more likely to be stopped and ID checked 
than a non-Roma person.
The data also shows considerable diﬀerences regarding the grounds based on which 
ethnic groups are stopped.
It is worth noting that in the category of “other ground” the proportion of Roma is higher 
(28%) than in the general sample (22%). Without traﬃc stops, this diﬀerence is even 
bigger, as the proportion of Roma persons in the “other” category increased to 30%.
It is obvious that, owing to its lack of concreteness (see above under Section 2), this is 
one of those categories under which oﬃcers have the most discretion to act on stereo-
types, so the level of over-representation in this category gives rise to serious concerns.
Similarly, the over-representation of Roma among persons ID checked due to the 
suspicion of a criminal act signiﬁcantly exceeds their level of over-representation in the 
general sample. If, however, we look at how eﬃcient these checks are, we can conclude 
35 Due to the problems already outlined in relation to the number of checks per 1,000 persons, it is very 
diﬃcult to ﬁnd a proper comparison. In 2003, the Roma population of Budapest was estimated by 
scientiﬁc research to be around 63,000. Today this number is estimated to have increased to 75,000. 
Compared to the total population of Budapest, 1.7 million people, this means that approximately 
4.4% of the population of Budapest is of Roma origin. The proportion of Roma is somewhat higher 
in the 6th District and its vicinity, although it is unlikely to exceed 10%. Using the highest estimated 
percentage, a Roma person is approximately 3.3 times more likely to be stopped and ID checked in 
the 6th District than a non-Roma. 
36 Estimation by László Zélity, Head of the Szeged Police Headquarters.
37 Estimation by Imre Bogdán, President of the Roma Minority Self-government of Kaposvár.
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that it is not more productive to ID check Roma at greater rates than non-Roma, 
despite the beliefs held by some police oﬃcers to the contrary. 
Graph 23: Ground of ID check broken down by ethnicity
3.3.2 Eﬀectiveness of ID checks, broken down by ethnicity
The data in our research shows that ID checks of Roma are no more likely to yield results 
than measures enforced in relation to non-Roma. It is often argued that a dispropor-
tionate targeting of ethnic minority groups is justiﬁed by diﬀerential rates of criminal 
involvement. The hit rate of police checks, however, shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerences by 
ethnic group. Put simply, if Roma were more likely to be involved in criminal activities 
then non-Roma, ID checks performed on them would lead to follow-up measures more 
often than the checking of non-Roma.
Graph 24: Eﬃciency broken down by ethnicity
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Roma are disproportionately subjected to ID checks, yet the data shows that they are 
no more likely to be involved in unlawful activities than ethnic Hungarians. On a 
national level, 78% of ID checks involving Roma were “unsuccessful” in the sense that 
no further measure was required after the check. For non-Roma this ratio was 79%. 
The percentage of checks followed by a petty oﬀence proceeding for Roma and non-
Roma was 19% and 18%, respectively. Rates of arrests and short-term arrests are practi-
cally the same within the Roma and the non-Roma sample.
Furthermore, when ID checks are initiated upon the suspicion of a criminal oﬀence 
(where in fact the hit rate is rather high), a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of Roma are 
stopped without a suﬃcient ground than non-Roma (37%, as opposed to 25%).
Graph 25: Eﬃciency of checks initiated due to the suspicion of a crime
If we look at the local results, we also see interesting diﬀerences.
Graph 26: Eﬃciency of checks in Kaposvár broken down by ethnicity (rounded ﬁgures)
In both Budapest and Szeged, Roma are subjected to groundless checks more often 
than are non-Roma. There is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in Budapest: 80% of 
the checks of Roma did not require any further police action, whereas the same propor-
tion for non-Roma was 59%. If we compare this with the fact that 33% of all the 
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persons checked are of Roma origin (which is a serious over-representation relative to 
their proportion of 5–10% in Budapest), we can see that the problem is more acute in 
Budapest than in the other pilot sites.
Graph 27: Eﬃciency of checks in Szeged broken down by ethnicity
Graph 28: Eﬃciency of checks in Budapest broken down by ethnicity (rounded ﬁgures)
3.4 Conclusions 
In Hungary, the annual number of ID checks (per 1,000 population) is high when 
compared with other nations in Europe. The police practice behind this result is based 
on the conviction that randomly initiated ID checks constitute an eﬃcient crime 
prevention and detection strategy. However, in the sample only approximately 20% 
of the ID checks were followed up by any measure, and of these measures, 18% merely 
involved the initiation of a petty oﬀence proceeding (i.e. proceedings launched due 
to transgressions of minor signiﬁcance). Arrests followed only 1% of the checks in our 
sample.
The research showed that those types of ID checks that are responsible for the majority 
of the measures (and which are not based on concretely identiﬁable facts, such as 
1
C O N T R O L ( L E D )  G R O U P
H U N G A R I A N  H E L S I N K I  C O M M I T T E E    2 0 0 942
intensive control, traﬃc control and “general checks”) are the least eﬃcient.38 A telling 
example can be seen in the trends at the Szeged Police Headquarters during the project 
period: the number of ID checks somewhat decreased, while the number of persons 
subject to an arrest warrant who were identiﬁed and taken into custody increased. 
Instead of trying to identify and arrest wanted persons by carrying out mass ID checks, 
the department chose to set up a specialized unit performing targeted checks based on 
intelligence. This made it possible to increase eﬃciency and at the same time decrease 
the number of checks.
Another important conclusion of the research is that Roma are disproportionately 
targeted by ID checks. Even though their proportion of the general population is only 
between 6 and 8%, persons perceived to be of Roma origin by the acting oﬃcers consti-
tuted 22% of those who were ID checked.
The research also refuted the ostensibly rational argument that is frequently presented to 
justify disproportionality; namely that the Roma are over-represented among oﬀenders, 
so the practice of checking them more often is objectively reasonable. 
Our results showed that there is no diﬀerence in the eﬃciency of checks targeting Roma 
and non-Roma: nationally, 22% of checks on Roma and 21% of checks targeting non-
Roma are followed by some measure. In cases where ID checks were initiated due to 
the suspicion of a criminal oﬀence, checks performed on non-Roma are, in fact, signiﬁ-
cantly more eﬃcient: checks based on the suspicion of a crime were followed up by 
some measure (arrest, short-term arrest or a petty oﬀence procedure) in 76% of those 
cases where non-Roma were involved, as opposed to 63% of the cases that involved 
Roma persons. It can therefore be concluded that the eﬃciency of disproportionately 
checking Roma people is a myth.
38 “General checks” are in fact not even lawful under the Hungarian Police Act, as the law requires 
concrete reasons substantiating each measure’s necessity.
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4.  Project Evaluation by Staff Members 
  of the Participating Police Units’ Staff
As already mentioned, the project was carried out in three diﬀerent pilot sites, namely 
in the 6th District of Budapest, in Szeged and in Kaposvár. Toward the end of the pro-
ject’s data collection phase, between 6 and 9 May 2008, the international project coor-
dinator, Rebekah Delsol, made an evaluation visit to each pilot site, accompanied by a 
member of the HHC. Together they were able to interview police oﬃcers about their 
experiences concerning the STEPSS project. The interviews were conducted with three 
diﬀerent group of police oﬃcers: a) patrol oﬃcers (two or three of them in a group 
discussion), b) supervisors/police department management (two or three of them), and 
c) heads of the relevant police units. A separate interview was also conducted with the 
person responsible for the project at the NPH. 
The interviews were conducted with the three categories of police oﬃcers separately 
and anonymously. An atmosphere of conﬁdentiality was crucial so that the interviewees 
– especially the patrol oﬃcers whose opinion is of crucial importance – would venture 
to share their opinion openly and honestly.
It was clear that by this point that almost everyone participating in the project under-
stood the purpose of the project. When asked “What was the objective of the project?” 
they answered that the aim was to only conduct ID checks when they are intelligence 
led, i.e. when linked to a petty oﬀence or crime, and should not be based on ethnic 
origin. In a nutshell, they understood that the aim was to change the institutional prac-
tice of the police. 
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Below we summarize their experiences and recommendations, broken down by the 
following topics:
1) Police support and understanding of the project
2) Training
3) General opinion about ﬁlling out the forms – advantages and disadvantages
4) Supervision of stops
5) Impact of the community involvement
6) Recommendations
4.1 Police support and understanding of the project
The Hungarian National Police Headquarters and the area commanders were supportive 
of the project and worked hard to implement it fully. During interviews commanders 
often spoke at length about the importance of the project, both from a policing perspec-
tive and to enhance legitimacy within the wider community. However, there was much 
less support among the oﬃcers on the street, and some supervisors did not see the need 
for the project. 
One of the supervising oﬃcers at Budapest 6th District Police was rather cynical about 
the project. He commented sarcastically that the project had met its goals because during 
the same period in 2006 they conducted 1,240 stops, whereas in 2007 merely 300 took 
place. He concluded that the changes had a negative impact on police eﬃciency because 
the number of wanted persons caught also dropped: in 2006 they caught 100, while in 
2007 only 30. Another supervising oﬃcer serving at the same unit disagreed with this 
assessment, claiming that while the number of ID checks had dropped by 70%, the 
number of arrests had decreased by only 33%.
This oﬃcer explained the possible reasons for having caught less wanted persons as 
follows: 
  “It involves the types of crimes committed at the Western Railway Station. We have 
CCTV there. Before the project, the practice was that you stopped everyone, even 
without a reason, knew the name of everyone who was present there at a particular 
night, and had picture of the people recorded on CCTV. So if there was a crime, 
you just had to put the face to the name. After the project began, we didn’t have the 
names anymore – so eﬃciency got much worse.”
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The former oﬃcer shared similar ideas about the possible reasons for the huge drop in 
the number of ID checks, but also added: 
 “Generally, it can be said that prior to the project oﬃcers might have selected people 
randomly, but after the project started, oﬃcers knew that they had to have a ﬁrm 
reason for stopping people. It was explained in the brieﬁng that the ﬁrm reason 
couldn’t be the colour of skin or clothes, so this could be the reason why the number 
of stops dropped dramatically.”
This oﬃcer also thought that the project did not necessarily improve the relationship 
with those stopped, as people are generally hostile to the police, the reason for which is 
not the issue examined by the project, but rather the political events of the past year.
The captain of the same police unit disagreed with his colleagues, holding that the 
project had been successful on all levels. He said,
 “We had diﬃculties at the beginning, but managed to make the oﬃcers under-
stand that this is not something aimed at controlling them but to generate public 
discourse, to get some information, data that can be useful for improving the legal 
framework. What was very useful was the internal evaluation at the beginning.39 
It would be useful to make that available to all. It was also useful for those oﬃcers 
who met our colleagues from the UK, and to hear about the experiences and chal-
lenges that are faced elsewhere.”
 “The objective evidence for the change is the drop in the number of ID checks, but 
there are several other elements that have contributed to the drop: the political envi-
ronment and the riots. But one of the elements is for sure the project. It is simply that 
the oﬃcers who are working out there on the street are thinking about these issues.”
The local Captain in Szeged said some interesting things concerning the success of the 
project:
 “A major advantage of the STEPSS project is data management. It could be espe-
cially useful if a complaint was ﬁled and there was a need to investigate the circum-
stances. I would like to replace the ID sheet with the STEPSS form, as the ID sheet 
is not as complete as the STEPSS form. It’s hard having forms in diﬀerent formats 
– it makes comparing and compiling data diﬃcult. I don’t think there is a big 
demand from citizens to receive a copy, but would be good to have this option for 
the ID sheets if they ask for it.”
39 The Deputy Captain in Szeged also emphasized the usefulness of the interim evaluation meeting held 
in Budapest, February 2008.
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He suggested some changes to the standard ID check forms, based on his STEPSS 
project experience: 
 “It is also important to include the reason for the stop on the ID check form, to have 
a list of options, like on the STEPSS form, outlining the reasons and objectives of 
the check. This should be standard for ID sheets. We have to do something long term 
to improve and record the citizens’ opinions of the police.”
 “Not having seen the results, the only beneﬁt I can see is a more positive attitude 
among the oﬃcers towards the citizens. The project should be spread to other areas 
beyond the pilot sites.”
The Deputy Captain in Szeged further commented on the results of the project, saying 
that,
 “The statistics haven’t changed signiﬁcantly, but what has changed is the style and 
the form of communication in stops.”
 “There were negative eﬀects as well. [The program] sometimes makes police oﬃ-
cers uncertain of their tasks and sometimes they didn’t take action when necessary. 
Another disadvantage of the program was the additional work that it created for the 
oﬃcers.”
The Captain in Kaposvár commented on the successful parts of the project, saying that,
 “The most successful aspect of the project was mainly the change in the oﬃcers’ 
thinking. They had some preconceptions, but this is the ﬁrst step to change their 
thinking, and the ﬁrst step in getting people to trust the police. Trust is very impor-
tant – it leads to so much more, such as the exchange of information.”
4.2 Training
Literally all those questioned said that the training was adequate. While this might be 
true, it must be noted that some of the participant oﬃcers did not understand every 
single element of the project. Éva Lukácsevich, the key NPH person on the project, said 
it was not surprising that some of the oﬃcers misunderstood certain components of the 
training, as there were more than 300 oﬃcers involved in the implementation phase. It 
was inevitable, then, to have diﬀerences in terms of the level of understanding. 
In light of the interviews, further development is warranted in several areas of the 
training. Following are a few examples from the implementation phase that highlight 
this need. 
47
P R O J E C T  E V A L U A T I O N  B Y  S T A F F  M E M B E R S  O F  T H E  P A R T I C I P A T I N G  P O L I C E  U N I T S ’  S T A F F
a) Some oﬃcers did not understand what it means to record the reason for the stop. 
This was so despite having the issue addressed at least twice per training session. The 
oﬃcers also received a copy of a circular on the topic sent out by the NPH. One 
of the patrol oﬃcers interviewed in Szeged told us that the training he received in 
the brieﬁngs and through the written information did not change his attitude to 
conducting stops. He said that,
  “Even prior to the new law coming into eﬀect we always told the citizens about 
the type of stop and told them, that the reason we are stopping him/her is to ﬁnd 
out his/her identity.”
 Here the oﬃcer is simply providing a reference to the formal aim of the measure. 
This clearly shows that he did not understand what it means to communicate the 
reason of the ID check with the person concerned. What has to be explained to 
the oﬃcers in the course of a further training in more details is that the citizens 
must be informed of the justiﬁcation for the ID check, which cannot be achieved 
by simply referring to the aim of the ID check as it is formulated in the law. What 
has to be shared with the citizens is something that makes it clear in what way the 
legally permitted aim of the ID check can be achieved by establishing the concerned 
person’s identity.40 For instance, it is not suﬃcient to quote the ground “crime detec-
tion” as the reason for the stop, the citizen also needs to know that he/she has been 
stopped on this ground, because a burglary has been committed in the neighbor-
hood, and every pedestrian is stopped within a certain perimeter. (Naturally – and 
in accordance with the Police Act – the information may be withheld if providing 
this information would pose a threat to the success of the police action.) 
b) Another example comes from Budapest, where one of the interviewed supervising 
oﬃcers, in relation to ID checks, said that,
  “Andrássy Boulevard is a world heritage site, so if you have a homeless person or 
drunk person in a public place, they are disturbing the public space, and so we 
move them on and ID check them. If we see a homeless person commit a theft 
on CCTV, then the following day we will ID check all the homeless people to 
ﬁnd that one. We have 90 homeless people living around Andrássy and we have 
CCTV but the picture is not that good, so still need to ID check everyone.”
 This means that a single attribute, that of being a homeless person, is enough for 
the oﬃcers to stop everyone who ﬁts this description. Homeless people will there-
fore be vastly overrepresented in the group of ID checked persons.41
40 Especially now that it is a legal obligation for the police oﬃcers to provide the reason for the measure 
prior to conducting it.
41 See Jenő Setét’s note reinforcing this allegation under Section 5.3.4.
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c) The third and ﬁnal example comes also from Budapest, where the interviewed 
patrol oﬃcers said the following in relation their ID check practice: 
  “[The supervisors] called our attention to the fact that these encounters can be 
biased, and what we call ethnic proﬁling can be present in institutional prac-
tice. We were asked not to stop as many Roma as we normally do in the district, 
so that we wouldn’t look biased. But the majority of proliﬁc oﬀenders are Roma, 
so when we do our work we stop more Roma.”
This exempliﬁes the (ostensibly rational) justiﬁcation for ethnic proﬁling that is revealed 
almost everywhere where research on this issue was conducted. (It needs to be empha-
sized again that this justiﬁcation was not supported by our research data – see Chapter 
3 above.)
4.3 General opinions about ﬁlling out the forms 
– advantages and disadvantages 
Contrary to our expectations, the oﬃcers were not very negative towards the extra 
bureaucratic burden imposed by the STEPSS forms. The high-ranking oﬃcers supported 
the introduction of similar tools, saying that it could be a useful policing instrument 
and that it contained relevant information. 
The two most common criticisms involved the necessity to ﬁll out the forms even in 
relation to non-autonomous checks and the clarity of the content. The oﬃcers thought 
it a burden to complete the STEPSS forms, even when the ID check was just a comple-
mentary measure in the course of another police action. They also felt that some of the 
reasons listed on the form were too vague.
Generally the oﬃcers interviewed in Budapest indicated that it was very easy to ﬁll out the 
paperwork, and that it did not take too long. However, one of them did complain about 
the burden of having had to ﬁll out two diﬀerent forms, as the Order of the National 
Commander obliges oﬃcers to investigate whether each person subject to an ID check is 
wanted or not, and then ﬁll out the oﬃcial form as well. The oﬃcer said that,
 “Common sense should work; it is always impractical to ﬁll out a form when no 
further measure is taken. If the person did not commit any violation, then it doesn’t 
make sense to record these actions. We have other regulations: now when you stop 
someone you have to make sure that they are not wanted, and we always have to ﬁll 
out a form for this. This way each [police] action lasts much longer than before. So 
it is not just the STEPSS forms, but these other internal rules.”
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Although this critique of the project is understandable, as it also required the ﬁlling out a 
form in each and every case, some of the oﬃcers seemed to understand the rationale behind 
the practice: the reason for the double administrative burden was that for the purposes of 
data protection the two types of forms had to be stored separated from each other.
Another patrol oﬃcer commented his confusion concerning those options listed on the 
STEPSS form as grounds for an ID check: 
 “The ﬁrst nine reasons were clear. The tenth reason was ‘other’, but it is hard to 
explain ‘other’ reasons, such as ‘crime prevention’. Most stops of proliﬁc oﬀenders in 
hot spots don’t ﬁt into this category, so I had to add a reason to justify it in a way 
that would be acceptable, for example that the behavior of the person changed upon 
seeing the oﬃcer.” 
The same reason was mentioned as the most problematic part of the form by one of the 
supervisor oﬃcers in Kaposvár. He said that,
 “There were some problems early on with completing the forms. The last possible 
reason for a stop was ‘other’, so oﬃcers obviously took the easy route and started 
putting in standard phases there rather than the real reason.” 
This might be why there were so many forms at the beginning that were not ﬁlled out 
properly. The oﬃcers may have thought it easier to circle “other” and then provide a 
generalized explanation, than to think about which category would best suit the given 
measure. When it was discovered that the oﬃcers in Kaposvár were ﬁlling out a high 
percentage of the forms incorrectly, we consulted the NPH as well as the local leader-
ship, however data show that our eﬀorts to improve the quality of ﬁlling out the forms 
in this respect did not have a positive impact on the practice, and the level of concrete-
ness of the explanations did not improve.
The Captain in Kaposvár said oﬃcers also had diﬃculty in recording the ID checked 
person’s ethnicity. They found it strange to be authorized to decide on who belongs 
to which ethnic group when the relevant laws rely on the concept of ethnicity by self-
determination. 
4.4 Supervision of stops
Supervision proved to be the weakest element of the whole project. It is particu-
larly interesting that while all the supervisors interviewed felt sure that oﬃcers were 
completing every form and claimed that they were comparing these to other records, 
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the numbers show otherwise. A great discrepancy exists between the numbers of ID 
checks and the STEPSS forms ﬁlled out. Although supervisors mentioned “spot checks” 
to monitor the quality of interactions, no patrol oﬃcers or civilian monitors mentioned 
that happening. ID checks are still seen as fundamental to police work, but very little 
discussion and measure of productivity has happened so far.
In Budapest, the interviewed patrol oﬃcers said that the only way to have active super-
vision while the oﬃcers are on patrol is to maintain a separate unit for this purpose. 
This unit goes out on the street, and when they see oﬃcers, ask them who gave the 
brieﬁng, what was mentioned in the brieﬁng, how many stops have been done, and 
what were the reasons for the stops. They also mentioned that the only diﬀerence they 
experienced due to the project was that at the end of each shift they handed over the 
forms not knowing what happened to them afterwards.
The supervisor at the Budapest 6th District Police indicated that initially they had to 
put a lot of eﬀort into supervision, and it required extra work, but that it later became 
routine. 
The Captain in Kaposvár said that the supervisory aspect of the project was a good 
initiative: 
 “We should continue with this part of the project, as before we did not know how to 
supervise the conduct of stops.” 
Furthermore, he said that,
 “There is a deﬁnite need for more emphasis on supervision within the Hungarian 
police forces, since traditionally ID checks were used by oﬃcers to show that they 
were doing something during their shifts. The idea was that the more measures you 
perform, the harder you are working. This mindset needs to change.”
We have to agree with the Captain of Kaposvár Police, as we think that one of the most 
problematic elements of the project’s implementation phase was the quality of supervi-
sion. For example, the Kaposvár Police started to follow a practice that was not in line 
with the agreed upon supervision methodology; the oﬃcer responsible for collecting 
the forms from his colleagues after their duty was over eliminated those forms that – in 
his view – were not properly ﬁlled. It could be argued that this is only one instance, and 
as such does not justify our criticism. However, given that patrol oﬃcers did not report 
a diﬀerence in the quality of supervision throughout the course of the entire project, it 
is diﬃcult for us to conclude that an improvement took place.
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4.5 The impact of community involvement
The patrol oﬃcers in Budapest said that the presence of a civilian did not change the 
way they conducted ID checks, but added: “It should be mentioned that you had to share 
attention between the ID checked person and the civilian monitor, but this is not really rele-
vant. We never took the monitor with us where there was a call necessitating police action.”
The supervisors were more talkative on this issue, they said that the monitors’ presence 
was very useful. One of them mentioned an incident where there was a homeless man 
who ﬁled a criminal complaint against an oﬃcer, accusing him of using violence. The 
monitor was summoned as a witness, and testiﬁed that it was a false complaint. This 
supervisor went on to say that,
 “I learnt a lot from the Roma observer, and they learnt a lot about police work and 
the challenges that we face. I also understand, as Jenő [head of the civilian monitors 
in Budapest] said, that when he is in the underground he always gets stopped. If 
there are 5 oﬃcers, he gets stopped 5 times by every oﬃcer, just because he is a Roma. 
Anyone would be unhappy with that.”
The supervisors in Kaposvár were also very positive regarding the community involve-
ment element. They spoke about one of the most sensitive issues surrounding commu-
nity involvement, namely the relevance of trust in the person who acts as a bridge 
between the community and the police. They said that,
 “The civilian monitoring went well enough that we’re able to think about continuing 
this. [...] The main problem is that the members of the minority community who are 
committing the crimes do not have a relationship with the Roma monitors. So those 
doing the monitoring cannot have a signiﬁcant impact in the communities and families 
that are committing crimes. The Roma community is divided into groups and families. 
[...] But [the project methods] can’t solve the problem of criminal families who do not 
accept Imre [head of the monitoring team in Kaposvár] and the other Roma reps.”
Beyond these comments almost every oﬃcer interviewed indicated that they had a 
very good impression of Roma monitors as individuals. This was completely diﬀerent 
compared to what they experienced before the project. The Roma monitors also held 
that meeting with police oﬃcers, and taking part in their everyday work opened their 
eyes to the diﬃcult aspects of police work. Such “enlightenment” might signiﬁcantly 
improve the relationship between the Roma and the police if the pilot project were 
institutionalized nationally. 
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4.6 Recommendations
At the end of the interviews we asked everyone what recommendations they would 
propose if the project were continued, or if the legal framework were amended in light 
of the experiences arising from the project. Here we summarize their ideas through 
anonymous examples. 
 “First, the legal framework around the conduct of ID checks needs to be amended. 
The framework should specify the permissible justiﬁcations for oﬃcers to conduct 
ID checks. At the moment there is a subjective element where oﬃcers can stop 
whoever they want, and the law doesn’t protect the oﬃcers, as they cannot justify 
their actions, as the law says nothing they could rely on. If the law would at least 
use the categories developed by the project, this would help.”
 “The other thing is the form. I would like the regular form to be more like the stop 
form. They are easier to complete and should be developed, so they could be added 
to a data base and used for management.”
 “We should give people a copy of the form.”
 “Public discourse: we should institutionalize this and it shouldn’t only be directed 
at the Roma because it is not about the Roma, but all citizens. Obviously the Roma 
have a more problematic relationship with the police, but it is really about the 
whole of society’s relationships with the police, so we need to open up the discus-
sion. There are some meetings through the local government, but these are political 
bodies and not under civilian control.”
 “A major advantage of the STEPSS project is the potential for data management. 
It would be especially useful if a complaint was ﬁled and then there were a need to 
investigate the circumstances. I would like to replace the ID sheet with the STEPSS 
form, as the ID sheet is not as complete as the STEPSS form.”
 “We have to do something long term to improve and record the citizens’ opinions 
of the police. I liked the idea that we saw in London where feedback from citizens 
is used in measuring police eﬃciency. We also need to follow the London example 
that the police there focus their forces on crime hot spots.”
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5.  The STEPSS Project from the 
  Civil Monitors’ Point of View
As indicated in the description of the project methodology, Roma civilians participated 
in the implementation phase of the program by monitoring police oﬃcers’ actions in 
conducting ID checks. The civilian monitors were present 36 times during the project 
period, so it was possible for them to obtain a realistic picture of what happened during 
the project. Our monitors also received information from the local communities about 
the oﬃcers’ activities concerning those occasions when they were not patrolling together 
with the police. Being among the key minority representatives in the region, the moni-
tors had fairly good contacts with the local minority community. Imre Bogdán is the 
president of the local minority self-government in Kaposvár, Zsolt Virág is the presi-
dent of the Szeged minority self-government, while Jenő Setét is the executive director 
of the Budapest based Roma Civil Rights Foundation (one of the most inﬂuential 
Roma NGOs in Hungary). 
The civilian monitoring has had a signiﬁcant impact on both the police and the 
community. At the start of the project many police oﬃcers were hesitant to have an 
observer in their vehicle, and had had minimal personal contact with Roma people. 
One oﬃcer mentioned to the project staﬀ how much he enjoyed speaking with the 
civilian monitor, saying: “I didn’t know Roma could be intelligent like that.” The ongoing 
contact has opened a door for oﬃcers to have frank discussions with the Roma commu-
nity members about patterns of oﬀending, cultural traditions, and other matters. This 
has led to the recognition of the need for more training. 
The learning has gone both ways. All of the civilian monitors mentioned developing 
a new perspective on police work, particularly a new understanding of the challenges 
police face and the fact they are not paid enough. Perhaps most remarkably, one civilian 
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monitor has decided to become a police oﬃcer as a result of his experiences. He will be 
the ﬁrst Roma police oﬃcer in that police district.
We must however also emphasize that Roma monitors’ involvement was not without 
any problems or counter-productive eﬀects. We know that the quality of ID checks 
was diﬀerent in the presence of monitors. We are also aware that oﬃcers tried to evade 
on-the-spot scrutiny by keeping monitors waiting for several hours. Some of the oﬃ-
cers also shared their racist views with the Roma monitors, creating an uncomfortable 
working atmosphere. 
Below we provide a more detailed summary of the monitors’ experiences, opinions and 
recommendations. They shared their comments with the project management through 
a written form, completed once the project’s implementation phase ended.
5.1 Imre Bogdán, Kaposvár 
Imre Bogdán felt that the project was an extremely important initiative, as this was the 
ﬁrst one in the country aimed at creating a cooperative atmosphere between the police, 
the Roma community and NGOs. His opinion concerning the relationship between 
the police and the Roma minority varied, depending on the police subunits (police 
stations) involved.
Administratively the Kaposvár Police embraces four other police stations: Igal, Taszár, 
Nagybajom and Kadarkút. His impression was that in Kaposvár and Taszár, the rela-
tionship between the police and the Roma is non-problematic. ID checks in these two 
areas are carried out without any undue disturbance to the civilians. 
Igal is a settlement where the unemployment rate is higher than 90%. According to 
Imre Bogdán, some of the locals are hostile to the police and react aggressively when 
stopped, despite the oﬃcers endeavoring to create a humane relationship with them. 
Nagybajom is the subunit whose operational area has the highest percentage of people 
belonging to the Roma minority. Mr Bogdán stated that oﬃcers working here have 
decent knowledge of local circumstances, but he criticized the fact that the head of the 
subunit has no relationship whatsoever with the Roma minority self-government, or 
with any other Roma or non-Roma NGOs for that matter. 
Kadarkút is the biggest subunit within the Kaposvár Police. This is where Imre Bogdán 
experienced the worst police attitudes towards Roma people. He thinks that oﬃcers 
serving in this police station are openly biased against the Roma. The relationship 
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between the police and the Roma is strained, and no eﬀorts have been made in recent 
years to amend the situation.
Regarding the positive impacts of the project, Mr Bogdán argued that the opportunity 
to work alongside the local police ultimately created a good relationship between the 
oﬃcers and the civilian monitors. After a few initial patrols together, he felt, the oﬃcers 
had become much more open to the Roma monitors. Mr Bogdán thinks it fair to state 
that the police oﬃcers (to a certain extent) came to understand that cooperation with 
civilians, and especially those belonging to the Roma minority, can be fruitful for both 
parties. He thinks that projects like this should continue so as to achieve real change in 
institutional police practices.
He criticized, however, the alleged conduct of unaccompanied oﬃcers. According to 
feedbacks he received from the Roma community, when monitors were not present at 
the ID checks the oﬃcers remained biased against the Roma.
He thought that the training of participating patrol oﬃcers constituted the weakest 
element of the project. In his view, the information provided to the patrolling oﬃcers 
was insuﬃcient to let them fully understand the project’s aim and methodology. Should 
there be any similar initiative in the future, he would suggest that much more emphasis 
be put on sensitizing the patrolling oﬃcers. 
5.2 Zsolt Virág, Szeged
Zsolt Virág was the monitor who was present on each occasion when civilian monitors 
were patrolling together with oﬃcers. As such, he gained extensive experience about 
police work, and the attitude of oﬃcers towards Roma. Being one of the most well-
known Roma rights activists in the region, he said that local Roma were shocked when 
they saw him patrolling together with the oﬃcers, often sitting in the police car, or 
having friendly conversation with police oﬃcers. However, after explaining the objec-
tives behind his presence at the ID checks, they accepted why it was necessary, and were 
not hostile toward him. 
At the end of some shifts, Mr Virág entered into long conversations with oﬃcers about 
so-called Roma issues. He informed the project management that at several points he 
heard racist and biased comments from the oﬃcers. He thinks that their attitude lies 
in the oﬃcers’ work experience, where they often see certain types of crime (like theft 
of other kinds of crime against property) that they believe are typically committed by 
Roma, and that this induces a hostile attitude toward Roma.
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Zsolt Virág has also stated that many of the oﬃcers did not understand how it was 
possible to require oﬃcers to record the ethnicity of the ID checked persons. He 
thought that the reason for the confusion was because the oﬃcers felt that this rule 
forced them to think in a discriminatory manner, whereas one of the aims of the project 
was to combat discrimination. 
This last comment touches upon an issue that Hungary has to face if a data collection 
system like the one applied in the STEPSS project is institutionalized. State agents, be 
they police oﬃcers or any other state-employed person, may be extremely reluctant 
to record sensitive data out of a concern that such categorization is tantamount to 
discrimination. It is very important, therefore, to clearly explain what discrimination 
means, and to show that in light of this explanation, recording ethnic aﬃliation is 
unproblematic both from legal and from moral standpoint. 
Zsolt Virág’s project experience had the most potential for a long-term, positive impact 
on the police-Roma relationship. For example, during the project he was asked by the 
police to give lectures on multiculturalism, with special emphasis on Roma culture. 
This proved to be a particularly fruitful initiative. He moderated several discussions 
on this topic, during which the oﬃcers became increasingly open-minded about the 
issue. In appreciation of his eﬀorts, Zsolt Virág was selected as the Szeged Police’s Roma 
contact person.
5.3 Jenő Setét, Budapest 6th District
Jenő Setét has divided his experiences into six themes. 
Cooperation with the police
Cooperation with the police was not eﬃcient enough, as both his colleagues and he 
were kept waiting on several occasions, sometimes for hours. Their presence as moni-
tors often turned out to be useless. The oﬃcers did not always go out on patrol on 
monitoring days, and even when this occurred, it often happened that no one was 
ID checked. Mr Setét wrote a letter to the head of the 6th District Police, sharing 
his disappointing experiences. In the letter, Mr Setét maintained that for the majority 
of the monitoring days, after several hours of waiting, the monitors left the police 
stations without having done anything meaningful. Out of the 24 days there were ten 
completely useless days and two when only one person was ID checked. In addition, 
most of the ID checked persons were homeless people who had done nothing unlawful 
that would have justiﬁed a regular stop. Upon receiving this complaint the Captain 
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called his employees’ attention to the poor quality of cooperation, which resulted in a 
much better working relationship. Mr Jenő Setét has been satisﬁed with the measures 
taken and their outcome. 
Communication
Mr Setét felt, just like Mr Bogdán, that despite the multiple (but brief ) trainings, and 
the information provided, the patrolling oﬃcers did not understand the relevance and 
goals of the STEPSS project. Therefore, the oﬃcers thought that the whole project was 
a useless, extra burden. The evidence for this lack of understanding lies in the patrol 
oﬃcers’ conduct toward the monitors. The oﬃcers constantly tried to convince the 
monitors that unrestricted power to stop citizens is important. Moreover, they also 
voiced their racist ideas to the monitors, which the monitors naturally took oﬀence to. 
ID checks
The oﬃcers’ behavior was controversial. In certain cases they did not stop or ﬁne persons 
whom they should have from a lay person’s point of view. In other cases they did not 
ﬁll out the STEPSS form, saying only that they would complete them at the end of the 
shift. Also, oﬃcers sometimes indicated on the STEPSS form that the monitor made 
no remark, when in fact the monitor was not asked for their input.
Reasons for ID checks
On several occasions the oﬃcers did not adequately in justifying the ID checks. The 
monitors came across “ﬂexible” reasoning like: “I thought he was on the list of wanted 
persons.” The oﬃcers stopped homeless people often, which sometimes gave monitors 
the feeling that the oﬃcers only did so to pretend to be doing something during the 
shift. 
Eﬃciency
Some of the ID checks were clearly justiﬁed, as they were followed by other measures. 
The necessity for the ID check was obvious in cases like taking a child to the police 
station who absconded from an orphanage, or when oﬃcers were acting upon a call 
from a citizen, etc. However, the larger part of the measures examined were not followed 
by any further action, and seemed to be useless.
ID check of Roma
In Mr Setét’s view, this is the most controversial issue. There were instances when the 
ID checked person seemed to be Roma to the monitors, but the oﬃcer indicated “non-
Roma” on the STEPSS form. The monitors also felt that the oﬃcers tried to avoid stop-
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ping Roma when they were patrolling together. On one occasion, they were called to a 
conﬂict among Roma where the complainant was not recorded as Roma, even though 
the oﬀenders were. Jenő Setét was convinced that the complainant was also of Roma 
origin. 
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6.  Recommendations
The totality of the data, taken together with other information concerning the ID check 
practice of the Hungarian police, leads us to conclude that ethnic proﬁling by oﬃcers 
is an existing problem that must be acknowledged. The STEPSS project’s ﬁndings are 
similar to those of TÁRKI’s qualitative research from 2006. Reform is needed in several 
aspects of policing in order to achieve a change in the mindset of police oﬃcers, as well as 
to improve police ID check practices. We recommend a multi-layered approach; one that 
addresses stereotypes and ethnic proﬁling, and challenges standard police practices that 
are perceived to be rational. The approach must also attempt to mitigate harmful eﬀects of 
these bad practices. We believe that at a minimum, the following steps need to be taken. 
6.1 Amending the Police Act
Although the amended legal deﬁnition of an ID check that came into eﬀect on 
1 January 2008 is more detailed than the previous one, the current regulation still 
confers almost unrestricted power on police oﬃcers to stop and ID check whomever 
they want. Reference to the still rather abstract possible reasons listed in Article 29 of 
the Police Act (e.g. crime prevention) does not adequately explain why it was neces-
sary to establish an individual’s identity. In a nutshell, the amendment does not truly 
restrict the power of the police to ID check citizens, although it is well-known and 
also supported by the results of the present research that racial proﬁling is especially 
widespread in relation to police measures the applicability of which is not dependent 
on reasonable suspicion (or another objective justiﬁcation). 
One possible solution would be to obligate police oﬃcers to communicate to the person 
subject to an ID check what is the speciﬁc, legally permitted basis for the establishment 
of that person’s identity and on what concrete factual ground he/she thought that the 
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legally permitted basis is actually in place in the particular case. In addition, if the 
citizen so requests, the oﬃcer should have to provide him/her with a written certiﬁcate 
about the ID check which contains the justiﬁcation for the measure. In case the oﬃcer 
refuses to give a concrete reason for the ID check (for example, by referring to the 
needs of public security, which the Police Act allows), a certiﬁcate evidencing the action 
taken should be given to the ID checked person, regardless of whether that individual 
requests one. The provision of a certiﬁcate should also be obligatory if the ID check 
is followed by a search. A search is such a deep intrusion of privacy that it justiﬁes the 
introduction of extra legal obligations. 
6.2 Data collection concerning ethnic afﬁliation
Processing data concerning ethnic aﬃliation is a sensitive issue, but there is increasing 
professional consensus that strict data-protection rules (and/or their strict interpreta-
tion) do not always serve the best interests of minority groups that they were originally 
designed to protect. In practice, the rules sometimes favor the discriminating parties, 
because groups suﬀering disadvantageous treatment cannot provide proof of unequal 
treatment without access to systemic data collection.42 Therefore it is essential that the 
law obliges oﬃcers conducting ID checks to record the ID checked person’s perceived 
ethnic identity, yet it has to be impossible to link the recorded data to a concrete person 
(i.e. in a way similar to the STEPSS project methodology). The resulting data should 
be broken down by the particular police oﬃcers and police units, and should be made 
accessible to anyone.43
6.3 Institutionalized relationship and discourse between local communities 
and the police 
Beyond these amendments to the law, it is also of key importance to make communica-
tion between local minority groups and the police regular and institutionalized. Within 
the Metropolitan Police of London the representatives from the police and diﬀerent 
local communities have meetings every month where, inter alia, they analyze stop and 
search data. In case any kind of disproportionality seems to occur, the police have to 
42 See: Pap, A. L.: A jogsértőket védjük a jogvédelem nevében? In: Rendészeti Szemle, 2008/5, pp. 
39–60.
43 In the UK, both self-deﬁned and perceived ethnicity must be recorded by the police, and this data is 
processed and analyzed. None of the minority groups has ever complained about this practice. 
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come up with an acceptable justiﬁcation for the disproportional practice. There are 
several arguments;44 what crucial is that the minority representatives get acquainted 
with the police’s reasons for the apparent disproportionality, and convey the informa-
tion to the wider public. Such communication makes it possible for communities to 
accept occasionally disproportionate but necessary police activities. The UK system 
operated so well that each independent police unit designated a community contact 
person. This individual can act proactively, letting a minority group who may have had 
conﬂicts with the police know if a major police operation is likely to be conducted in 
their region.45 The minority delegate, who must be seen as a legitimate representative of 
the given group, will then spread the information provided within his/her community.
6.4 Training of police ofﬁcers
Combating discrimination and changing the practice of an institution with several tens 
of thousands of employees certainly requires training. The civilian monitors astutely 
pointed out that any legal amendment would be useless without adequate training. 
Untrained police oﬃcers might be reluctant to apply new legal provisions, thereby 
undermining reform. The proposed training needs to be introduced at two diﬀerent 
levels of the oﬃcers’ educational process: 1) a training integrated into the standard 
curriculum of police colleges and police secondary schools, and 2) a special in-service 
training for oﬃcers who have already completed their studies. The content of the 
training should cover the following fundamental issues:
a) The concept and forms of discrimination
b) The concept and forms of ethnic proﬁling
c) Researches into ethnic proﬁling – international examples
d) Researches into ethnic proﬁling – Hungarian examples
e) Sensitization of oﬃcers – discussion with Roma representatives
f ) Outline of Hungarian legal provisions concerning data protection
44 E.g. in those areas densely populated by black people there were a relatively large number of police 
operations due to the number of calls from these places by civilians. In the concerned period of time 
there were several crimes committed by perpetrators who, according to the witnesses’ perception, were 
black.
45 It is not necessary for a group that regularly commits crimes to have strained relationship with the 
police. Furthermore, an immigrant group may have had very bad experiences with police oﬃcers in 
their country of origin, making the members of this particular group wary of uniformed persons. This 
can easily be the source of conﬂicts. 
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To be most eﬀective it is essential that the training be adapted to the needs of the diﬀerent 
oﬃcer ranks. Supervisors need practical training on how to identify and address discrimi-
nation among the oﬃcers that they supervise, whereas patrol oﬃcers need speciﬁc prac-
tical training on how to conduct police work in a non-discriminatory manner. 
The inclusion of minority community members is of key importance, both in the delivery 
and participation elements of the training. It is essential for the minorities themselves to 
be able to talk about their experiences encountering racism as well as their interactions 
with the police. As noted, the project was successful primarily because it provided an 
opportunity, outside of a crime-control context, for police oﬃcers to mix with members 
of minority groups. The anecdotal evidence shows that regular contact with members 
of ethnic minorities can serve to break down police stereotypes of Roma, and has led 
to increased interaction. A well-managed dialogue between police and community 
members has resulted in broader engagement with ethnic minority groups. 
6.5 The quality of ID checks
Studies published on the topic of ethnic proﬁling conclude that when an individual is 
subject to an ID check, the attitude and tone of the oﬃcer(s) (besides the number of 
ID checks or the degree of proportionality) have a signiﬁcant impact on whether the 
measure feels harmful to the civilian or not. The 1 January 2008 amendment to the 
Police Act obliges police oﬃcers to communicate the reason or purpose of the measure 
to be applied against citizens; an obligation which did not exist before. It is important 
to make oﬃcers understand that full compliance with this provision can considerably 
improve public opinion about the police. If one knows why he/she is subject to a 
certain procedure, he/she may be less tense. This makes it easier for the individual to 
see why the stop was necessary even if that person has not done anything unlawful. In 
short, if the ID check is based on reasonable grounds that are communicated to the 
person subject to the measure, then there is a lower probability that the person will feel 
discriminated against. 
6.6 Improving the performance assessment of police ofﬁcers
As interviews with higher ranking police oﬃcers suggest, the number of ID checks is 
often used in assessing police oﬃcer eﬃciency. To improve the quality of ID checks, the 
value placed on quantity needs to be “repositioned”, i.e. regarded as merely one factor 
in data management, rather than as a ﬁnite measure of police eﬀectiveness. 
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To achieve this goal new and reformed performance assessment tools should be intro-
duced. Evaluation of eﬀective policing should not rely on only one factor, such as the 
number of perpetrators caught, the number of ﬁnes imposed for committing a petty 
oﬀence, or the number of ID checks conducted. The assessments, however, should 
take into account citizen satisfaction with local police work. Citizen input provides an 
incentive for under-performing police units to focus on community relations rather 
than, as in the current system, on data manipulation.46 Finally, the eﬀectiveness of ID 
checks should be systematically monitored and the results need to be incorporated into 
operational practice. 
6.7 Review and improve supervision structures
Patrol oﬃcers have too much autonomy. Supervisors need to be trained on how to best 
supervise street patrols and supervisory mechanisms need to be put in place so that 
discrimination can be not only be recognized, but acted upon. The inclusion of civil 
monitors is one way to positively address these issues.
46 Under the present system, a police unit might rank ﬁrst nationally for eﬀective policing, even though 
the citizens’ satisfaction rating of the same unit might consider the unit to be among the worst. The 
unit, in order to manipulate its national ranking, can decide to pursue mostly minor crimes or petty 
oﬀences, resulting in thousands of successful ID checks and in a high number criminals caught. At 
the same time, however, those perpetrators that are diﬃcult to ﬁnd will remain free and continue to 
pose a serious threat to the local community. This is especially true in terms of drug-related crimes: it 
is easier to ﬁnd 100 drug users than to catch one drug dealer who sells drugs to 1,000 users.
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Annex 1: ID check sheets used for the research 
ID check form (September – November 2007)
1. Time of ID check
  1.1 Morning 06–12h
  1.2 Afternoon 12–18h
  1.3 Evening 18–22h
  1.4 Night 22–02h
  1.5 Dawn 02–06h
2. Place of ID check
  2.1 Street
  2.2 Pub/disco/etc.
  2.3 Park
  2.4 Road
  2.5 Other
3. Gender of concerned person
  3.1 Male
  3.2 Female
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4. Age of concerned person
  4.1 14–16
  4.2 17–18
  4.3 19–29
  4.4 30–39
  4.5 40–
5. Ground of ID check
  5.1 Suspicious object
  5.2 Intensive control
  5.3 Traﬃc control
  5.4 Security measure
  5.5 Finding a wanted person
  5.6 Suspicion of crime
  5.7 Suspicion of petty oﬀence 
  5.8 Prevention of an act jeopardizing public order 
  5.9 Possession of legally prohibited object
  5.10 Other, namely: 
 If you indicated one of points 5.5–5.10, please describe brieﬂy on what actual 
circumstances you based the measure.
 
 
 
 
 
6. Result of ID check
  6.1 Arrest
  6.2 Short-term arrest
  6.3 Petty oﬀence procedure
  6.4 No further measure required
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7. Based on the perception of the police oﬃcer, the concerned person is:
  7.1 Asian
  7.2 Arab
  7.3 Caucasian
  7.4 Black
  7.5 Roma/Gypsy
  7.6 Other
8. Civil monitor
  8.1 No civil monitor was present
  8.2 Civil monitor was present, no remark
  8.3 Civil monitor was present, remark made
Remark:
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ID check form (November 2007 – March 2008)
1. Time of ID check
  1.1 Morning 06–12h
  1.2 Afternoon 12–18h
  1.3 Evening 18–22h
  1.4 Night 22–02h
  1.5 Dawn 02–06h
2. Place of ID check
  2.1 Street
  2.2 Pub/disco/etc.
  2.3 Park
  2.4 Road
  2.5 Other
3. Gender of concerned person
  3.1 Male
  3.2 Female
4. Age of concerned person
  4.1 14–16
  4.2 17–18
  4.3 19–29
  4.4 30–39
  4.5 40–
5. Ground of ID check
  5.1 Suspicious object
  5.2 Intensive control
  5.3 Traﬃc control
  5.4 Security measure
  5.5 Finding a wanted person
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  5.6 Suspicion of crime
  5.7 Suspicion of petty oﬀence 
  5.8 Prevention of an act jeopardizing public order 
  5.9 Possession of legally prohibited object
  5.10 Other, namely: 
 If you indicated one of points 5.1 or 5.4 – 5.10, please describe brieﬂy on what 
actual circumstances you based the measure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 If you indicated 5.2 please state below the order’s number or  date 
 
 
 
 
 If you indicated 5.3 please mark the type and estimated age of the vehicle:
 Type: 
 Age:  less than 3 years
    3–8 years
    more than 8 years
6. Result of ID check
  6.1 Arrest
  6.2 Short-term arrest
  6.3 Petty oﬀence procedure
  6.4 No further measure required
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7. Based on the perception of the police oﬃcer, the concerned person is
  7.1 Asian
  7.2 Arab
  7.3 Caucasian
  7.4 Black
  7.5 Roma/Gypsy
  7.6 Other
8. Civil monitor
  8.1 Civil monitor was present, no remark
  8.2 Civil monitor was present, remark made
Remark:
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Annex 2: Sampling design and methodological issues
1. Sampling design
The research was carried out at three locations: Budapest 6th District, Kaposvár, and 
Szeged between 17 September 2007 and 17 March 2008.
It was agreed that patrolling oﬃcers would ﬁll out a STEPSS form every time they 
performed an ID check. 
Due to the very high number of checks (22,375) performed within the six-month 
monitoring period we took a proportionate, layered sample. In doing so, we had to 
overcome some problems. 
The ﬁrst problem was that in Szeged, the data collection was stopped as of 1 March 
2008 (instead of 17 March). Furthermore, in Kaposvár, around the mid-term of the 
project, for approximately two months, the police started to follow a practice that was 
not in line with the previously agreed methodology. In this period, the oﬃcer vested 
with the task of collecting the forms from his colleagues after their duty was over elimi-
nated those forms that, in his view, were not properly ﬁlled out. After this was dis-
covered by the National Police Headquarters, clear instructions were given to the 
Kaposvár personnel, and the original methodology was restored.
Another diﬃculty was caused by the fact that not all of the envelopes in which the 
forms were sent by the participating police units indicated the period of collection. As 
such, it was not always possible to establish in which trimester of the project period the 
individual forms were ﬁlled out. Thus, the chronology of the forms could not be fully 
established.
To overcome the problem caused by the lack of recorded dates, for the purposes of the 
trend analysis, we separated the forms with dates from those without, forming two 
groups. We created a sample from the dated group by ﬁrst dividing the total into three 
subgroups. Each of the dated subgroups were then further subdivided by location. The 
questionnaires in each of these subgroups were placed in chronological order. From 
the ﬁrst ﬁve questionnaires, one was selected randomly. Then, counting from the ﬁrst 
selected questionnaire, every ﬁfth was selected. These selected items constituted the 
sub-sample that was to be analysed. Since the number of items in the Kaposvár sub-
sample was substantially higher (2,551) than the number necessary for a statistically 
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signiﬁcant sample (300 items), the above described mistake committed by the Kaposvár 
Police Headquarters did not prove to be problematic. 
Following this, we created three subgroups from the non-dated forms, numbered them, 
and then pulled out a random sample in the same way as described above (every ﬁfth 
form). Putting the sub-samples together from the dated group and the non-dated 
group, we had a ﬁnal randomised sample to analyse. For trend analysis we used the 
dated sample, but for any analysis where time was not relevant, the combined sample 
was used.
As indicated in the body text, the total number of forms and number used for the 
sample were as follows:
Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of forms 2,015 11,255 9,105 22,375
Number of forms 
in sample
403 2,251 1,821 4,475
2. Necessary adjustments to the data
In addition to the above outlined problems, it came to light toward the end of the 
project that a signiﬁcant number of the ID checks performed during the monitoring 
period had not been followed by the completion of the STEPSS forms. 
At the HHC’s request, the police units participating in the project provided informa-
tion regarding the number of ID checks they performed over the seven-month period 
(1 September 2007 – 31 March 2008), which also included six months of data collec-
tion (17 September 2007 – 17 March 2008). In this period, the three participating 
units performed altogether 43,094 ID checks.1
1 Information provided by the police units participating in the project. The three headquarters 
concerned collected the information on the total number of ID checks in diﬀerent ways. The 6th 
District collected the information from the register of database inquiries (in terms of internal police 
norms, all ID checked people shall be cross-checked with the central data base for wanted persons, so 
the number of checks can be calculated based on the number of database inquiries). The other two 
headquarters provided the information based on the daily reports of oﬃcers on duty, as well as the 
database which summarized the information coming from these daily reports. 
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Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of checks 3,538 25,770 13,786 43,094
These ﬁgures are for seven months, whereas the data collection period lasted for 6 
months, so we made an adjustment by calculating the average monthly number of 
checks and multiplying that number by six.
Premises Budapest Kaposvár Szeged Total
Number of checks 3,033 22,089 11,817 36,939
As can be seen, this number is still much higher than the number of STEPSS forms 
received from the police units. 
In order to be able to determine the extent to which the police forces complied with 
their obligation to ﬁll out a STEPSS form after each ID check, we also had to calculate 
the number of STEPSS forms that would have been received if some forms had not 
been eliminated in Kaposvár, and if the data collection had not been stopped as of 1 
March in Szeged.
With regard to Kaposvár, we presumed that approximately half of the forms were elimi-
nated by the supervising oﬃcer. This means that during the two months when this 
practice was followed, a deﬁcit of one month accumulated, i.e. the number of forms 
actually received from Kaposvár (11,255) corresponds to ﬁve months instead of six. 
Thus for six months, we extrapolated to 13,506 forms.
With respect to Szeged, we calculated the monthly average number of forms ﬁlled out, 
and added half of this number to the total (9,105). This way, we calculated that in 6 full 
months, the number of properly ﬁlled STEPSS forms would have been 9,934. 
After the adjustments, we arrived at the following ﬁgures.
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Overall data of ID checks within the project period 
Area Number
of stops
Percentage 
of total
Number of forms 
completed
Percentage of total Percentage 
of forms compared 
to total number 
of checks
Budapest 3,033* 8% 2,015 8% 66%
Kaposvár 22,089* 60% 13,506** 53% 61%
Szeged 11,817* 32% 9,934** 39% 84%
Total 36,939* 100% 25,455** 100% 69%
* Adjusted ﬁgure
** Hypothetical ﬁgure
3. Problems calculating the number of ID checks per 1,000 population
Whereas with regard to Kaposvár and Szeged it was relatively easy to calculate the 
annual number of ID checks per 1,000 population (using the ﬁgures provided by the 
police for the 1 September 2007 – 31 March 2008 period, we ﬁrst calculated the average 
monthly number of checks, multiplied this by 12, and then compared the result to the 
population of Greater Kaposvár and Greater Szeged), a reliable comparison with the 
population of Budapest 6th District was very diﬃcult to make. The 6th District (one of 
the 23 administrative units in Budapest) contains one of the city’s three main railway 
stations as well as a large number of shops, restaurants and oﬃces. As a result, the 
district’s population is far smaller than the number of people who actually frequent the 
area on an average weekday. 
The 6th District’s population is approximately 39,0002 (from a total city population of 
approximately 1,700,000). If we compare this estimate to the total number of checks, 
we get a distorted picture, especially when considering the large number of people 
who visit the railway station and the Westend City Center on a daily basis (60,000 and 
40,000 respectively; there is an overlap between these numbers, since the mall is located 
near the station).3 Therefore, we estimated the population of the district to be 65,000 
for the purposes of calculating the ID check ratio per 1,000 population.
2 Estimation by Zsolt Akács, Head of the Department for Public Order at the 6th District Police 
Headquarters.
3 Estimation by Zsolt Akács, Head of the Department for Public Order at the 6th District Police 
Headquarters.
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ID check is the most frequently used police measure in Hungary: on average, more than 
1.5 million checks have been conducted annually in recent years. However, the practice of ID 
checks has not been properly analyzed so far. Therefore, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
sought to assess the typical grounds of ID checks and the efﬁciency of this police measure 
in the framework of a project supported by the European Commission’s AGIS Program and 
the Open Society Institute. It was also examined whether there is a discriminatory tendency 
regarding ID checks, namely if members of the Roma minority are ID checked in unjustiﬁed 
and disproportionate numbers compared to their non-Roma peers. The current report provides 
a brief description of the methodology and the sometimes surprising results of the project.
